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The term jurisdiction may be defined as the authority to affect legal
interests-to prescribe rules of law (legislative jurisdiction), to adjudi-
cate legal questions (judicial jurisdiction) and to enforce judgements the
judiciary made (enforcement jurisdiction).1 The definition, nature and
scope of jurisdiction vary depending on the context in which it is to be
applied. United States domestic law, for example, defines and applies
notions of jurisdiction pursuant to the United States constitutional pro-
visions relating to the separation of powers. Within the United States,
jurisdiction is defined and applied in a variegated fashion depending on
whether a legal problem is within the federal or the state sphere.
Among the states, the definition and scope of jurisdiction also vary.2
The international setting gives rise to another set of definitions and
applications of the notion of jurisdiction. International law has failed to
develop jurisdictional rules that are as comprehensive or precise as the
domestic jurisdictional laws of individual nations.3 Indeed, international
law has tended to focus on penal rather than civil jurisdiction. More-
over, the set of rules relating to criminal legislative, judicial and enforce-
ment jurisdiction in the international setting is not as well developed as
the parallel domestic laws of the various nations.4 Generally, this article
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1 L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 420 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN]; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT DRAFT].
2 Henceforth the term "state" when used in this paper, will indicate a nation-state or
country, unless specifically stated otherwise. Thus, the separate states of the United States of
America will be designated states of the Union or some similar denomination.
3 HENKIN, .supra note 1, at 421.
4 Id.
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will discuss the problem ofjurisdiction over extraterritorial crime by an-
alyzing the interaction between United States domestic and interna-
tional law relating to jurisdiction. In 1935, Harvard Research on
International Law (Harvard Research)5 identified five theories of criminal
jurisdiction: territorial; protective; nationality; universal; and passive
personality. These theories, representing the possible bases for a state to
claim jurisdiction over actions committed abroad and proscribed by its
criminal law, provide the organizational format for this article.
As an introduction, a brief definition of each of these theories of
jurisdiction is provided. The "territorial theory" allows for jurisdiction
over conduct that takes place within the territorial boundaries of the
state. The "nationality theory" bases jurisdiction on the allegiance or
nationality of the perpetrator of the offenses as prescribed by the state of
5 Prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction are considered in Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 474 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
Harvard Research]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, §§ 6-7 (1962). Both provide that while states may validly prescribe rules affecting
the conduct ofpeople outside their territorial limits, they may only enforce those rules within
their own territory. See 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1976), United States v. Thompson, 28 F. Cas. 102
(C.C.D. Mass. 1832) (No. 16492). See also Note, Extratemitorial Jurisdiction in Crininal Law, 13
HARV. INT'L L.J. 346 (1972). Prosecution by contumacy or default is covered by CODE DE
PROCtDURE PPNALE [C. PR. PLaN.] arts. 627-41 (Dalloz 1966) (Fr.), and discussed in De-
laume,Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed Abroad" French and American Law, 21 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 173 (1952).
Rollin Perkins lists only four theories of jurisdiction. He merges the passive personality
theory with that of the protective principle. Professor Perkins replaces the Harvard designa-
tions, except for the territorial theory, with the following: "nationality jurisdiction" becomes
the "Roman" theory; the "protective principle" becomes the "injured forum theory," and the
"universal theory" becomes the "cosmopolitan." Perkins, The Territorial rinciple in Crimi'al
Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1155 (1971). Professor Perkins' article was prepared for the Eighth
Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, and was published in, LEGAL
THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW, INC. 657-70 (1970).
Federal and state court decisions in the United States, as well as most course books and
treatises on International Law, have adopted the Harvard Research designations. See, e.g.,
Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d
545 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960); W. FRIED-
MANN, 0. LISSITZYN & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (1969); W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1971); HENKIN, supra note 1; 6
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw ch. XV (1968). See general.' Feller, Concur-
rent Jurisdiction in the International Sphere, 16 ISRAEL L. REV. 40 (1981); ShachorLandau, Extra-
territorial PenalJurisdiction and Extradition, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 274 (1980); Hirst,jurisdiction
Over Cross-Frontier Offenses, 97 LAw Q. REv. 80 (1981); Lew, The Extra- territorial CriminalJuris-
diction of English Courts, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 168 (1978). See a/so R. MERLE & A. VITU,
TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL ch. 3 (2d ed. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 10-19 (1965); RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note
1, § 402; Feller,Jurisdiction over OfeRes with a Foreign Element, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 5 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 60-76 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965); G. LEwis,
FOREIGN JURISDICTION AND THE EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS 30 (1859) (cited in Harvard
Research, supra, at 483).
EXTRA TERRITORIAL CRIME
his allegiance, no matter where the offenses take place. The "protective
principle" or "injured forum theory" emphasizes the effect or possible
effect of the offense and provides for jurisdiction over conduct deemed
harmful to specific national interests of the forum state. The "passive
personality principle" extends jurisdiction over offenses where the vic-
tims are nationals of the forum state. The "universal theory" allows
jurisdiction in any forum that obtains jurisdiction over the person of the
perpetrator of certain offenses considered particularly heinous or harm-
ful to mankind generally.6
A brief analysis of the parameters of four of the traditional theories
of extraterritorial jurisdiction provides a foundation for criticism of re-
cent developments in extraterritorial jurisdiction theory. This article es-
tablishes that the objective territorial theory (the most frequently
articulated basis for assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction) has always
required that a significant adverse effect occur within the asserting
state's territory. The protective principle (sometimes asserted as well),
on the other hand, allows assertion of jurisdiction over offenses which
are intended to have an effect within the asserting state's territory. The
protective principle, however, is limited to those offenses which pose a
threat to national security, sovereignty, or some important governmen-
tal function. The universality principle allows the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over offenses, even though the offenses have no effect on the
territory of the asserting state, if the offenses are recognized as being so
heinous as to allow any state obtaining jurisdiction over the person of
the perpetrator to assert jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Specifically, this article studies recent United States judicial asser-
tions of jurisdiction over thwarted extraterritorial conspiracies. The au-
thor criticizes the expansion of the theoretical bases of jurisdiction to
prescribe articulated by the courts and incorporated into the American
Law Institute's draft of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Restatement Draft) 7 as a justification for the extension of
jurisdiction.
The thwarted extraterritorial narcotics conspiracy aimed at impor-
tation of narcotics into the United States is chosen as the primary exam-
ple and focus of this article because United States case law, in discussing
6 See generally supra note 5. Often, today, a sixth theory of jurisdiction is articulated.
Under what is sometimes called the floating territorial principle, the "flagship" state is recog-
nized as having jurisdiction over any offense committed on one of its craft or vessels. If this
were not so, the law and judicial competence would change as the vessel moved from territory
to territory. See generaly Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Note,Juridiction, 15 TEx.
INT'L LJ. 379, 404 n.3 (1980); Empson, The Application of Criminal Law toActs Committed Outside
the Jurisdiction, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32 (1967); George, ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legisla-
tion, 64 MICH. L. REv. 609, 613 (1966). See infla note 92.
7 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402(c).
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this crime, has extended jurisdiction in a manner which obliterates the
meaning of the traditional theories of jurisdiction over extraterritorial
crime. The frustrated extraterritorial narcotics conspiracy comes close
to fitting into several of the traditional theoretical bases of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, but actually fits none.
In the case of a thwarted extraterritorial conspiracy, obviously, no
significant effect has occurred to trigger the objective territorial theory.
Unless the conspiracy threatens national security or impairs some gov-
ernmental function, the protective principle is inappropriate. The
universality principle is not properly applied since most conspiracies are
not universally condemned. Thus, the attempt to force the thwarted
extraterritorial conspiracy into the mold of any one jurisdictional theory.
effectively extends that theoretical basis to the point of making it mean-
ingless. In such a manner, the Restatement Draft's suggested expansion of
the objective territoriality theory as the means of including offenses in-
tended to have an effect on United States territory, such as thwarted
extraterritorial conspiracies, is deficient because, being thwarted, the of-
fenses never actually cause such an effect.
This analysis of the Restatement Draft and the United States case
law suggests that the traditional theories of jurisdiction remain the es-
sential and sole bases for assertion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial
crime and that adherence to those theories is required. The Restate-
ment Draft adopts the traditional bases of jurisdiction over extraterrito-
rial crime8 and posits the rule of reasonableness as a means of limitizg
the assertion of jurisdiction in the international context. 9 The "rule of
reasonableness" requires that even when an appropriate traditional ba-
sis for jurisdiction exists, assertion will not be proper if it is exorbitant or
unreasonable. Assertion of jurisdiction will be exorbitant if there is sig-
nificant interest by another state in asserting jurisdiction. Using the ter-
minology of private international law or the conflicts of law, the rule of
reasonableness is an attempt to determine the proper forum when two
or more states have a traditional basis for asserting jurisdiction. Thus,
no assertion of jurisdiction is proper without one (or more) of the bases,
but even if such a basis exists, the rule of reasonableness may block the
exorbitant or unreasonable assertion of jurisdiction. Assuming this to be
true, it is necessary to define the categories or bases of jurisdiction con-
ceptually, to determine whether there has been any expansion of the sepa-
rate bases and to determine whether there is room for a new theory to
accomodate assertion of jurisdiction over thwarted extraterritorial
conspiracies.
8 Id. § 402.
9 Id. § 403.
EXTRA TERRITORIAL CRIME
It is also important, therefore, to determine whether the assertion of
jurisdiction over thwarted extraterritorial conspiracies is properly based
on one or more of the traditional theories, or whether a new or hybrid
theory of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime ought to be or has now
been implicitly adopted. This article articulates such a hybrid theory,
which the Restatement Draft and case law implicitly adopt but improp-
erly categorize. The article's purpose is to develop a proper theoretical
vehicle to produce the correct results-assertion of jurisdiction; not to
suggest that the thwarted narcotics conspiracy cases discussed herein
ought to have been decided differently. The recent cases and the Restate-
ment Draft are conceptuallymore sensible (and their correct results will
maintain rather than detract from the conceptual validity and integrity
of traditional jurisdictional theory) if this new theoretical basis is
recognized.
This article will demonstrate that while the Restatement Draft does
not recognize the rule of reasonableness as a new basis of jurisdiction in
itself; it does suggest the possibility that the rule of reasonableness will
allow several theories or bases to be combined to allow assertion ofjuris-
diction over offenses for which no single theory alone would be appro-
priate, as long as the assertion is not exorbitant. This is precisely what
the courts have been doing, but they have inartfully articulated the the-
ory of their approach to be the objective territorial theory alone or to be
some other equally inappropriate theory. The new theory articulated
herein combines the notions of the objective territorial theory, the pro-
tective principle and the universality principle to approve assertion of
jurisdiction when the limits of each of the theories separately would not
allow it, as long as such an assertion would not be exorbitant or un-
reasonble. Thus, the hybrid theory is designed to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction over the thwarted extraterritorial narcotics or analogous
conspiracy, when that conspiracy is conceptually close to meeting each
of the three mentioned theories, but not close enough to fit. In such
cases, intention to impact on the asserting state's territory clearly evi-
denced by the facts and the circumstances will be sufficient for assertion
of jurisdiction as long as that assertion is not unreasonable. Assertion of
jurisdiction on this theory will not stretch the boundaries of the objec-
tive territorial theory or any other separate traditional basis beyond
meaningful limits. In addition, adoption of the jurisdictional approach
articulated in this article would also resolve many of the problems relat-
ing to extradition in the case of extraterritorial crime.
In sum, this article first defines and develops the traditional theo-
retical bases in international law for asserting jurisdiction over extrater-
ritorial crime. This is done in some detail so that the parameters of each
basis will be clear. Next the recent judicial extension in the United
1982] 1113
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States of the bases of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime is analyzed
and criticized. The rectification of the conceptual deficiences this case
law has created will follow and lead into an analysis of the recent Restate-
ment Draft. The analysis criticizes the Restatement Drafts's deficiencies,
but utilizes its rule of reasonableness as the springboard for the develop-
ment of the new or hybrid theory which allows assertion of jurisdiction
over thwarted extraterritorial conspiracies without eviscerating the
traditional theories of jurisdiction.
II. TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
The territorial principle is the most common basis of jurisdiction
over crime in the United States. The criminal law, as it has developed
in the nation-state, is territorial in principle; it has its basis in the con-
ception of law enforcement as a means of keeping the peace within the
territory. 10 Nation-states are generally considered competent to pre-
scribe laws and to prosecute all offenses committed, in whole or in part,
within their territory. Harvard Research describes the territorial
principles:
(a) crime is committed "in whole" within the territory when every essen-
tial constituent element is consummated within the territory; it is commit-
ted "in part within the territory" when any essential constituent element is
consummated there. If it is committed either "in whole or in part" within
the territory, there is territorial jurisdiction.' I
Sovereignty requires that the power in control of the territory pre-
scribe and enforce its laws in that territory; any state that does not main-
tain this prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction within its territory is
not sovereign.12 Chief Justice Marshall, in 1812, expressed what has be-
10 Perkins, supra note 5, at 1155. At about the time of the nascency of the "nation-state,"
the "kings peace" was the ideological tool used to promote the consolidation of power against
"private justice." "In these transitions we observe the evolution among the Germanic people,
and especially among the Franks, from blood-revenge, essentially anti-legal in character [but
nevertheless, in reaction to acts considered common-crimes today] to a system in which rules
of public law and procedure were developed and penalties prescribed, designed primarily to
keep the peace. The retaliatory element gave way in large measure to public defense, but the
elimination of the dangerous offender, whether by exile, death, or slavery, continued to be a
primary means of protection. The objectives of general deterrence and individual prevention
inhered in the establishment of the king's peace .... ." Tappan, Pre-Classical Penology, in
ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE 45 (G. Mueller ed. 1961); Blakesley, The Practice of Extradition
from Antiquity to Modern France and the United States. A Brief Histogy, 4 B.C. INT'L AND COMP.
LJ. 39, 46-47 nn.28-35 (1981).
11 Harard Research, supra note 5, at 495.
12 The clan, feudal, or national ruler anciently and during the middle ages considered it a
duty of his honor and often a religious necessity to punish offenses against his sovereignty, his
people or the gods. Acts, such as theft, murder or rape, considered common crimes today,
were subject to "private justice" or individual reprisal rather than the modern reaction of a
sovereign or state. Tappan, supra note 10, at 33. There is an interesting interrelationship
1114 [Vol. 73
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come the traditional United States' perception of sovereignty:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu-
sive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.
Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would
imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the same extent in that power
which would impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full
and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced
up to the consent of the nation itself.13
It follows, Chief Justice Marshall declared, completing his notion of
the relationship between sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction over
crime, "[that], the courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another."' 14
The territorial principle of jurisdiction has traditionally been very
between the notions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and extradition developing from the earliest
of recorded history.
Because patriarchal families, tribes, and clans were in control of their own destiny and
their own justice, thepater fami/ias came to represent and had the duty to protect the "sover-
eignty" of the family, clan, or tribe. Moreover, in these ancient social cells, expulsion was the
ultimate penalty for internal crime. For example, endangering the tribal food supply, usually
incurred the sanction of banishment. Thus, if the ultimate sanction were banishment, the
authority of the social cell certainly would not seek the return of individuals who had com-
mitted offenses within the cell. In addition to banishment, it was necessary that the cell purge
itself from the "curse of the gods or the threat of the unknown." Blakesley, supra note 10, at
46; R. Fairbanks, A Discussion of the Nation Status of American Indian Tribes: A Case
Study of the Cheyenne Nation 31 (1976) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis in Columbia University
School of Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Fairbanks' Thesis]. Intra-tribal murder, for ex-
ample, in Native American society "required the keeper of the arrows to cleanse the tribe of
the spectre of death." Fairbanks' Thesis, supra. See also M. FUSTEL DE COUTLANGES, LA CITE
ANTIQUE CH. XTH (1864) [hereinafter cited as FUSTEL DE COULANGES]. In addition to ban-
ishment and tribal purging, ancient society also developed a phenomenon called the composi-
lion. Composition was similar to what modern states reserve for tort claims. The injured
individual was compensated by the perpetrator or his family for the damage done. See H.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 358 (5th ed. 1978).
Composition was not entirely tort-like, however, as the social cell often felt obliged to
purge itself of the threat of metaphysical dangers resulting from the occurrence of the wrong-
ful act. See supra Fairbanks' Thesis; K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); FUSTEL DE COULANGES,
supra.
The pater familias or tribal chieftain, in keeping with whatever procedure was required
by its law and custom, would determine what activities were to be deemed punishable, by
different groups at different times. Murder, theft, or assault, were relatively rare although not
unheard of conduct within the kinship group. When such conduct occurred as a result of
external intervention into the social cell, retaliation, vengeance, or an attempt to acquire the
return of the perpetrators often was needed, so that the "purging" of the crime could take
place. If the fugitive were needed for the tribal expiation, his rendition would be sought. The
sanction for another tribe's refusal to return such a fugitive was often war or an attack to
punish the entire refusing tribe, thus purging the taint through punishment by proxy.
Notwithstanding the "private justice" caveat, attempts to obtain rendition of fugitives were
sometimes not too dissimilar from modern extradition. See Blakesley, supra note 10, at 46-47.
13 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
14 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
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strictly applied in the United States, 15 it has had negative as well as
positive application. For example, in 1906, jurisdiction was refused in a
case in which a French citizen was suspected of murdering an American
citizen in China. The Secretary of State, referring to this case, stated:
[T]he United States government does not exercise jurisdiction over crimes
committed beyond the territorial limits of this country, except a few in-
volving [this case] is not included. Our [consular officials] have no author-
ity to try a French citizen charged with a crime in that country [China]
even though the victim should happen to be an American.16
15 E.g., the Cutting Case, 1887 Foreign Rel. 757.
16 M.S. Department of State, file no. 226/16 (Sept 17, 1906), quoted in II G. HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 179 (1942). Any acceptance of jurisdiction under the cir-
cumstances of this case would have been on the basis of the passive personality principle. The
passive personality theory of jurisdiction is generally considered to be anathematic to United
States law. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 30(2) comment e (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATMENT], clearly states
the traditional repudiation of the principle: "A state does not have the jurisdiction to pre-
scribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory
merely on the ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals." See also J. BRIERLY, LAW
OF NATIONS 302 (1955). This has not been changed in the recent RESTATEMENT DRAFT,
supra note 1, §§ 402-403.
The United States government has vehemently protested any foreign courts'assertion of
jurisdiction over acts of United States nationals committed against nationals of the forum
state outside that state's territory. The Cutting Case, 1887 U.S. Foreign Rel. 757, reported in 2
J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 232-40 (1906); reproduced in M. HUDSON, CASES
AND OTHER MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (1929), provided the opportunity for
the most famous protest. Mr. Cutting, a United States national, had been seized by Mexican
authorities upon a visit to Mexico. He was jailed to await prosecution for criminal libel that
he allegedly perpetrated in Texas against a Mexican national. The United States Secretary
of State's protest presents the unequivocal United States position repudiating the passive per-
sonality theory of jurisdiction.
[T]he assumption of the Mexican Tribunal, under the law of Mexico, to punish a citizen
of the United States for an offense wholly committed and consummated in his own coun-
try against its laws was an invasion of the independence of this Government.
[I]t is not now, and has not been contended, by this Government . . . that if Mr.
Cutting had actually circulated in Mexico a libel printed in Texas, in such manner as to
constitute a publication of libel in Mexico within the terms of Mexican law he could not
have been tried and punished for this offense in Mexico ...
As to the question of international law, I am unable to discover any principle upon
which the assumption of jurisdiction made in Article 186, of the Mexican Penal Code
can be justified ...
It has consistently been laid down in the United States as a rule of action, that
citizens of the United States cannot be held answerable in foreign countries for offenses
which were wholly committed and consummated either in their own country or in other
countries not subject to the jurisdiction of the punishing state ...
To say that he may be tried in another country for his offense, simply because its
object happens to be a citizen of that country, would be to assert that foreigners coming
to the United States bring with them the penal laws of the country from which they
come, and thus, subject citizens of the United States in their own country to an indefina-
ble criminal responsibility. 2 J. MOORE, supra at 234-38.
In 1940, a case similar to Cutting arose, and the Counselor of the Department of State
instructed the American Consul General in Mexico City, as follows:
This Government continues to hold the views which it expressed to the Mexican
Government in the Cutting Case mentioned in your dispatch, in which case there was
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Later, the United States Supreme Court declared that American
law provides that legislative and judicial jurisdiction in criminal matters
rests solely with the legislative and judicial branches of government of
the state or country in which the crime is committed. 17 Stating the a
contrario logic of the same concept, the United States Supreme Court
held, "[a] local criminal statute has no extraterritorial effect and a party
cannot be indicted in the United States for what he did in a foreign
country."18
On its face, the territorial theory of jurisdiction is deceptively sim-
ple. The United States, however, applies fictions and exceptions which
transfuse actions taken abroad into its legal notion of territorial jurisdic-
tion or, alternatively, which allow assertion of jurisdiction based on an
exceptional theory even though there may be no true territorial connec-
tion. Statutory authority is required to authorize the extension of judi-
cial jurisdiction to offenses committed beyond territorial limits. As
explained below, the courts have been adept at interpreting statutory
authority so as to allow such jurisdiction.19
involved the validity of Mexican legislation . . . .This Government continues to deny
that, according to the principles of international law, an American citizen can be justly
held in Mexico to answer for an offense committed in the United States, simply because
the object of that offense happens to be a Mexican citizen, and it maintains that accord-
ing to the principles of international law, the penal laws of a State, except with regard to
nationals thereof, have no extraterritorial force.
Accordingly, it is desired that your office should refrain from recognizing the above
quoted provisions of Mexican law in the event that another American citizen shall be
detained in Mexico charged with an offense committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
Instruction from counselor of the Department of State involving M.S. Department of State,
File 312.1121, Seidler, Richard/ 1 (cited and quoted in M. WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 103-
04).
Certainly, where a principle of jurisdiction in one state is anathema and in another an
ascendant and important principle, disputes will arise when the state claiming the validity of
the theory of jurisdiction seeks extradition from the other.
17 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). Se also Brown v. United States, 35 U.S.
App. 548 (1910); Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413 (1875).
18 United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512, 517-18 (1912). Of course this flat
statement must be qualified today by the realization that there are some substantive crimes
and theories of jurisdiction which provide legislative or judicial jurisdiction.
19 While the United States law has tended more to modify the territorial principle in
order to provide for jurisdiction over extraterritorially committed crime, French law and
commentary, for example, have promoted a more elaborate extension by way of establishing
separate theories-the nationality theory (personalit6 active), the passive personality theory
(personalit6 passive), and the protective principle-as exceptions to the territorial principle.
The extensions and exceptions exist to correct certain specific vexing problems and to fill gaps
that would arise in a system based solely on the territorial principle. The French exceptions
are contained in C. PR. PEN. art. 689-96. Professor Delaume explains the limits of this notion:
[O]nce a statute is promulgated, it is irrelevant whether its scope is limited to the
punishment of nationals or to that of foreigners, or rather whether it combines the idea of
jurisdiction based on allegiance with that of the punishment of only certain types of
offenses. It is also irrelevant that such a statute is not express, provided there cannot be
any doubt as to the legislative intent. Delaume, supra note 5 at 181.
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A. JURISDICTION OVER EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIME, A CONSTITUENT
ELEMENT OF WHICH OCCURS WITHIN UNITED STATES
TERRITORY (SUBJECTIVE TERRITORIALITY)
It is not uncommon for the United States to extend jurisdiction
Case law in the United States has approved jurisdiction over nationals in situations in
which the appropriate statute did not explicitly declare that it applied extraterritorially. In-
deed, United States citizenship or nationality often appears to play a significant role in the
application of United States legislation to extraterritorial conduct. See, e.g., Steel v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Ramirez and Feraud Chile Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146
F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956), af'dper curiam, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 927 (1958); Cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). This
latter case held that the Lanham Act did not apply to a Canadian Corporation, even though
harm was done in the United States by offenses committed by that corporation. Jurisdiction
has been approved, for example, in the case of a violation outside the United States of a penal
clause in an absentee voting statute. State v. Maine, 16 Wis. 398, 421 (1863). American
nationals, assisting in the the illegal immigration of alien contract laborers have been prose-
cuted on the basis of nationality jurisdiction. United States v. Craig, 28 Fed. 795, 801 (1886).
Even a murder which a United States national committed on an uninhabited Guano island
was considered proper subject matter for a United States court. Jones v. United States, 137
U.S. 202 (1890). Interestingly, the same philosophy as that which motivates France to apply
nationality jurisdiction, namely the accused's likelihood of escaping justice altogether, moti-
vated United States application of the principle here. A contempt judgment for failure to
comply with a subpeona that a consular officer had served has been upheld, see Blackmer v.
United States 284 U.S. 421 (1932), and jurisdiction to require income tax payment by nation-
als domiciled abroad has been sustained. Cook v. Tate, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). Sometimes the
same act committed by an alien and a national might only be punishable against the na-
tional. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). Nationality jurisdiction, where it is
deemed appropriate, is applicable even though the national is also a national of the state in
which the offense is committed. Coumas v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 2d 682, 192 P.2d 449
(1948); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
The United States Supreme Court declared its basic attitude toward nationality jurisdic-
tion in United States v. Bowman:
The three defendants who were found in New York were citizens of the United
States and were certainly subject to such laws as it might pass to protect itself and its
property. Clearly it is not offense to the dignity or right of sovereignty of Brazil to hold
them for this crime against the government to which they owe allegiance. 260 U.S. at
102. And again, in Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932), the Supreme
Court stated, "[w]ith respect to such an exercise of authority, there is no question of
international law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the
duties of the citizen in relation to his own government."
Thus, the nationality theory ofjurisdiction has become an important means of obtaining
jurisdiction even in the United States. Its application is not as expansive as that in France,
although the trend in the United States has been to expand even its application. Neverthe-
less, no general principle exists that United States nationals are liable under United States
law for violations of United States law wherever they may be. The extension of the national-
ity principle by legislation or by case law has been limited. In fact, the crimes to which the
nationality principle has been extended have generally been those which indicate a strong
protectionist motive. For example, in Bowman, jurisdiction was extended to cover a United
States national's fraudulent acts committed abroad which were directly injurious to the gov-
ernment. The Court stated, nationals, are "certainly subject to such laws as [the United
States] might pass to protect itself." 260 U.S. at 102. See also Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421 (1932).
Delaume cites an interesting statute from Texas, now rescinded, that exemplifies the
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over an offense consummated outside United States territory, when a
constituent element of that offense occurs within the United States (sub-
jective territorial principal). The United States federal system has pro-
vided fertile ground for the development of the subjective territorial
principle. Indeed, since the United States' jurisdictional scheme in crim-
inal law and procedure is established upon a composite of variegated
legislation and case law of the several states (and territories), as well as
that of the federal authority, maintenance of a strictly applied territorial
principle would render any question of legislative or judicial jurisdiction
very difficult to resolve. The possible difficulties that could arise under a
strictly applied territorial system have been mitigated by an application
of the subjective territorial principle.20
The various states of the United States have applied this subjective
theory of jurisdiction to acts consummated in other states of the Union,
as well as to those consummated in foreign countries. This has been
done notwithstanding the language of the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution, which indicates that a person must have his
trial "in the state and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted .... ,,2 Thus, a crime is deemed to have been committed
within the territory, as long as an element of it occurs there.
The subjective territorial principle is promoted in the Model Penal
Code, 22 which many states have adopted in modified form.2 3 States em-
bracing the subjective principle have extended the principle in one of
legislative extension of jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad. The Texas statute
provided:
Persons out of the State may commit and be liable to indictment and conviction for
committing any of the offenses enumerated in this chapter which do not in their commis-
sion necessarily require a personal presence in this state, the object of this chapter being
to reach and punish all persons offending against its provisions, whether within or with-
out the State.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1009 (Vernon 1936). The validity of this statute was upheld in
Hanks v. The State, 13 Tex. Grim. 289 (1882); see Delaume, supra note 5, at 181 n.25. See also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (1953) discussed infra in note 23.
20 Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 484.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CF. United States v. Jackalow, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 484 (1861).
There is possibly a constitutional basis for such jurisdiction over extraterritorially committed
crime. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, provides that, "[t]he trial of all crimes, excepting cases of
impeachment . ..shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed
but when not committed within any State, the trial [of a federal crime] shall be at such Place
or Places as the Congress may by law have directed." The drafters of the Constitution, how-
ever, undoubtedly had in mind crimes committed on the high seas or in other places outside
the territorial jurisdiction of any state, not crimes committed in other sovereign jurisdictions.
See, 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1976). Note, ExtrateritorialJurisdiction-Criminal Law, 13 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 346, 347 n.4 (1972) was very helpful in the development of this section.
22 Section 1.03 of the proposed official Model Penal Code provides:
Territorial Applicability.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, a person may be convicted under the
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law of this State of an offense committed by his own conduct of another for which he is
legally accountable if:
(a) either the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is such
an element occurs within this State; or
(b) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to
constitute an attempt to commit an offense within the State; or
(c) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to
constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within the State and an overt act in
furtherance of such conspiracy occurs within the State; or
(d) conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in the commission of,
or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit, an offense in another jurisdic-
tion which also is an offense under the law of this State; or
(e) the offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the law
of this State with respect to domicile, residence or a relationship to a person, thing,
or transaction in the State; or
() the offense is based on a statute of this State which expressly prohibits conduct
outside the state, when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate inter-
est of this State and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is likely to
affect that interest.
(2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply when either causing a specified result or a purpose
to cause or danger of causing such a result is an element of an offense and the result
occurs or is designed or likely to occur only in another jurisdiction where the conduct
charged would not constitute an offense unless a legislative purpose plainly appears to
declare the conduct criminal regardless of the place of the result.
(3) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply when causing a particular result is an element of
an offense and the result is caused by conduct occurring outside the State which would
not constitute an offense if the result had occurred there, unless the actor purposely or
knowingly caused the result within the State.
(4) When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the bodily impact
causing death constitutes a "result", within the meaning of Subsection (1)(a) and if the
body of a homicide victim is found within the State, it is presumed that such result
occurred within the State.
(5) This State includes the land and water and the air space above such land and water
with respect to which the State has legislative jurisdiction.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
23 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (1978), which provides:
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commiits,
while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or that of another for which
he is legally accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or
(b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to commit an offense
within the state; or
(c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense
within the state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or
(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspir-
acy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both this state
and such other jurisdiction.
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct which is an
element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within this state. In
homicide, the result is either the physical contact which causes death, or the death itself;
and if the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death shall be pre-
sumed to have occurred within the state.
(3) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of
this state is committed within the state, regardless of the location of the offender at the
time of the omission.
See also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 778(a) (West 1970), which provides:
Whenever a person, with intent to commit a crime, does any act within this state in
execution or part execution of such intent, which culminates in the commission of a
crime, either within or without this state, such person is punishable for such crime in this
state in the same manner as if the same had been committed entirely within this State.
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two ways: in the form of a general rule relating to all crimes; 24 or in a
piecemeal fashion in the case of specific offenses. Anti- dueling legisla-
tion, for example, common in the past and still extant today, provides
an interesting and clear example of the application of the subjective ter-
ritorial principle over a specific crime by statute. Section 779 of the
California Penal Code reads:
When an inhabitant . . . by previous appointment or engagement, fights
a duel or is concerned as a second therein, out of the jurisdiction of this
state, and in the duel a wound is inflicted upon a person, whereof he dies
in this State, the jurisdiction of the offense is in the Country where the
death happened. 25
This statute applies an interesting combination of the principles of sub-
jective territoriality, objective territoriality and elements of the national-
ity principle not often applied in the United States. 26
The commentary to the Model Penal Code explains that where con-
duct within the territory of the forum state causes harm outside the
state, jurisdiction will usually be allowed if the conduct within the state,
standing alone, would constitute an attempt to commit the offense
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 27 (West 1970), which provides: (a) The following persons are
liabile to punishment under the laws of this state:
1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this state;
2. All who commit any offense without this state which, if commiitted within this state,
would be larceny, robbery, or embezzlement under the laws of this state and bring the
property stolen or embezzled, or any part of it, or are found with it, or any part of it,
within this state;
3. All who, being without this state, cause or aid, advise or encourage, another person
to commit a crime within this state, and are afterwards found therein.
(b) Perjury, in violation of Section 118, is punishable also when committed outside of Cali-
fornia to the extent provided in Section 118.
24 S e, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 27 (West 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (1978).
25 CAL. PENAL CODE § 779 (West 1970). Note that jurisdiction under this statute obtains
for the crime of dueling beyond state boundaries, not homicide. See also id. § 231 (leaving the
state with intent to evade laws against dueling).
26 Id. § 231 states:
Every person who leaves this State with intent to evade any of the provisions of this
Chapter [Duels & Challenges], and to commit any act out of this State such as is prohib-
ited by this Chapter, and who does any act, although out of this State, which would be
punishable by such provisions if committed within this State, is punishable in the same
manner as he would have been in case such act had been committed within this State.
See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980).
State laws prohibiting cruelty to animals have been made to apply extraterritorially.
E.g., N.Y. AGRI. & MKTs. LAW § 367 (McKinney 1965) provides:
A person who leaves this state with intent to elude any of the provisions of this article or
to commit any act out of this state which is prohibited by them or who, being resident of
this state, does any act without this State, pursuant to such intent, which would be pun-
ishable under such provisions, if committed within this state, is punishable in the same
manner as if such act had been committed within this state.
Similar provisions existed in former New York laws prohibiting masked and disguised persons
from assembling, see N.Y. PENAL LAW ch. 41, § 712 (Consol. 1923)(repealed 1970), and that
prohibiting assemblages of anarchists, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165 (Consol. 1923)(repealed
1970).
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charged. 27 Jurisdiction over larceny by fraud, for example, will usually
be asserted even though the delivery and acceptance of the goods occur
outside the territory, as long as false representations have occurred
within the forum's territory.2 8 Similarly, jurisdiction over a homicide
may be allowed when the conduct within the forum state constitutes an
attempt to commit homicide, even though the death occurs outside the
state.2 9 Generally, for jurisdiction to obtain, it is necessary that the act
within the forum state be so related to the offense consummated else-
where that, even if nothing else happened in the furtherance of the of-
fense, the act within the state would still have constituted an attempt.
30
Thus, territorial jurisdiction will be asserted on a subjective theory
over offenses committed partially within a state, but consummated
outside that state's boundaries. 3 1 Jurisdiction under the Model Penal Code
will also apply when an offense is commenced outside a state's territory
but consummated within, or over offenses committed completely outside
the territory, if the effect or result of the offense occurs within the state.
32
The theory behind the application of jurisdiction, therefore, moves from
subjective territoriality to objective territoriality. 33 The Model Penal
Code34 and the proposed Federal Criminal Code35 encourage an expansive
27 MODEL PENAL CODE, comment to § 1.03 at 5-6 (Tent. Draft No. II) (submitted to the
Council of the American Law Institute for dicussion at the meeting of March 15, 16, and 17,
1956).
28 See People v. Zayas, 217 N.Y. 78, 111 N.E. 465 (1916).
29 See People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901). This is the famous case in which
California courts took jurisdiction over a person and convicted him of mailing poisoned
candy from California to his intended victim in Delaware. The victim ate the candy and died
in Delaware.
30 See People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925), and cases cited in Harvard
Research, supra note 5, at 484-87.
31 Decisions of courts in the United States over the years have construed this type of
legislation so as to approve the assertion ofjurisdiction where any element of an offense occurs
within the state. See, e.g., People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901); State v. Sheehan,
33 Idaho 553, 196 P. 532 (1921); People v. Licenziata, 199 A.D. 106, 191 N.Y.S. 619 (1921);
People v. Zayas, 217 N.Y. 78, 111 N.E. 465 (1916). In Licenziata, the defendant sold wood
alcohol in New York as a beverage. The alcohol was taken to Massachusetts where someone
drank it and consequently died. The victim died in Massachusetts but the defendant was
convicted in New York of manslaughter. This conviction was based on N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 134 (Consol. 1930)(repealed 1970), which provided, "when a crime is committed, partly in
one county and partly in another, or the acts or effects thereof, constituting or requisite to the
consummation of the offense, occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either
county." See additional cases and statutes reviewed in Berge, CriminalJurisidictian and the Ter-
ritorialPrinciple, 30 MICH. L. REV. 238 (1931); Levitt,Jurisdiclion over Crimes, 16 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 316 (1925). Some cases construing newer statutes similar to the
old New York laws are: People v. Utter, 24 Cal. App. 3d 535, 101 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1972);
Conners v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 311, 508 P.2d 1185 (1973) and cases cited in Schwab,
Have Crime Will Travel: Borderlines and CriminalJurisdiction, 50 S.B.J. 30 (1975).
32 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (Tent. Draft No. II, 1956).
33 See infra notes 38-62 and accompanying text.
34 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03. (Proposed Draft 1962).
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application of both the subjective and objective theories for assertion of
territorial jurisdiction.
United States law will usually allow the assertion of jurisdiction
over acts of participation within United States territory in offenses con-
summated abroad, over extraterritorial attempts to commit offenses
within the United States and over acts of participation abroad in of-
fenses consummated within United States territory. Since early com-
mon law development, the United States has asserted jurisdiction over
participation locally in offenses perpetrated abroad.36 Although Profes-
sor Wharton has suggested that the common law would still allow such
jurisdiction to be asserted, today a statute is generally considered
necessary.3 7
B. JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES COMMITED OUTSIDE THE
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT WHOSE
EFFECT OR RESULT OCCURS WITHIN THAT TERRITORY
(OBJECTIVE TERRITORIALITY)
American law has traditionally allowed the assertion of jurisdiction
over offenses when the conduct giving rise to the offense has occurred
extraterritorially, as long as the harmful effect(s) or result(s) take place
within the jurisdiction's territorial boundaries (objective territoriality).38
35 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL
REPORT 21 (1970); Feinberg, ExtraternritonaJudsdicion andthe Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 72
J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 385 (1981). For the first time the United States Legislature
has provided a general rule regarding the nature and scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction over
crime. See, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1979); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 111(c) (1979).
36 Id. § 233. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 778(b)(Deering 1909)(as amended), provides
that the following people are liable to punishment under the laws of California:
3. Every person, who, being out of this state, causes, aids, advises, or encourages any
person to commit a crime within this state, and is afterwards found within this state, is
punishable in the same manner as if he had been within this state when he caused, aided,
advised or encouraged the commission of such crime.
37 See I.F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 333 (12th ed. 1932) and cases cited
therein.
38 John Bassett Moore stated that objective territoriality is "[t]he principle that a man
who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at
the place where the evil is done, is recognized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries."
J. MOORE, supra note 16, at 232-40. Other noted jurists have similarly stated, that, "[t]he
setting in motion outside of a State of a force which produces as a direct consequence an
injurious effect therein, justifies the territorial sovereign in prosecuting the actor when he
enters its domain." 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 798 (2d ed. 1945). The objective terri-
torial principle has essentially three applications: (1) to assert jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted abroad when the effect or result occurs within the territory of the asserting state; (2) to
seek extradition of the person accused ofcommiting such an offense and; (3) to approve extra-
dition of an accused who has committed such an offense against the requesting state.
It should be noted that in the United States it is necessary that legislation provide for
jurisdiction in situations in which either the subjective or objective territoriality theories
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Probably the most often cited United States Supreme Court decision
enunciating this principle of objective territoriality is
Strassheim v. Dailey. 9 In Srasshe'n, the defendant fraudulently sold as
new, secondhand machinery to the State of Michigan by bribing the
warden of the Michigan State Prison who was to receive the machinery.
The false pretenses and the bribery actually occurred in Chicago rather
than in Michigan. Nevertheless, in the appeal from the habeas corpus
discharge of the defendant, Mr. Justice Holmes, for the United States
Supreme Court stated, "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended
to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in
punishing a cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if
the state should succeed in getting him within its power."' 40 It is clear
from Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion and from historical precedent that the
objective territorial principle is not designed to apply when parties merey
intend their criminal activity to have effect within territorial boundaries,
but contemplates only those cases in which the intended effects actually
occur within those boundaries.
The objective territorial principle is designed to allow the state to
should obtain. See Perkins, supra note 5, at 1157 n.9; see also Commonwealth v. MaCloon,
101 Mass. 1 (1869), where the court makes it clear that statutory authority is required for
judicial competence in a homicide case in which the victim was wounded on board a British
vessel on the high seas, but died in Massachusetts. The problem, of course, in all of these
cases is the determination of what is "the evil effect" or result which will allow the assertion of
jurisdiction. See Comment, Junsdiction over Interstate Homicides, 10 LA. L. REV. 87 (1949).
See a/so Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495 (1878); State v. Lang, 108 N.J.L. 98, 154 A. 864
(1931); CAL. PENAL CODE § 778 (West 1970), which provides:
When the commission of a public offense, commenced without the state, is consummated
within its boundaries by a defendant, himself outside the state, through the intervention
of an innocent or guilty agent or any other means proceeding directly from said defend-
ant, he is liable for punishment therefore ....
See also People v. Utter, 24 Cal. App. 3d 535, 101 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1972); People v. Anderson,
55 Cal. 2d 655, 361 P.2d 32, 12 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1961); Conners v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 311, 508
P.2d 1185 (1973). It should also be noted that United States courts in civil matters have now
moved away from the so-called pure "effects" theory of jurisdiction which was initially as-
serted and accepted by analogizing to the objective territorial principle in international law.
See the development of the rule in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), and the retrenchment of the rule in World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); see also Note, The Long-Arm
Reach of the Courts Under the E fect Test After Xulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REV. 175 (1979).
Jurisdiction in criminal matters, on the other hand, is expanding to cover extraterritorial of-
fenses more comprehensively.
39 Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
40 Id. at 285 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Strassheim cites the following cases
as supporting the objective territorial principle historically; American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893); Common-
wealth v. McCloon, 101 Mass. 1 (1869); Commonwealth v. Smith, 11 Allen 243 (1874).
See also United States v. King, 533 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1976); Rivard v. United States, 375
F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Layton, 509 F.Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981); People
v. Fea, 47 N.Y.2d 70, 390 N.E.2d 286, 416 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1979).
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take jurisdiction and to prosecute, convict and punish the perpetrator of
conduct which causes harm within the territory of the forum state, even
though none of the conduct occurs there. The harmed state obviously
has a significant interest in doing so. For example, Kansas deemed it
important to assert jurisdiction over a Missouri man for the crime of
abandonment, when the man's wife and child became domiciled in
Kansas after he abandoned them in Missouri. The continuing effect or
harm of the Missourian's neglect or abandonment clearly occurred in
the place in which the wife resided.
4
'
It is sometimes true that the substantive definition of the crime pro-
vides that the crime itself comes into legal existence at the moment and
in the place where the criminal consequences arise. This is a clear statu-
tory adoption of the objective territorial principle by substantive defini-
tion. In Louisiana, for example, homicide is defined as "the killing of a
human being by the act, procurement or culpable omission of an-
other, ' 42 and the criminal code provides that the crime of homicide oc-
curs where the criminal consequences take place.4 3 Thus, if a person
shoots a gun and mortally wounds a person in Mississippi but the person
succumbs to his wounds in Louisiana, the perpetrator will have commit-
ted a homicide in Louisiana, although all of his actions took place in
Mississippi.4 4 Or, if a person illegally sends from one state, where simi-
41 State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 P. 1052 (1918). See also United States v. Fernan-
dez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974); Fry v. State, 36 Ga. App. 312, 136 S.E. 466 (1927); In re
Fowles, 89 Kan. 430, 131 P. 598 (1913); State v. Klein, 4 Wash. App. 736, 484 P.2d 455
(1971). But compare United States v. Columbia-Colella, 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979) (court
held that United States courts have no jurisdiction over an agreement made in Mexico to sell
in Mexico a car that had been stolen in the United States).
42 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:29 (West 1974).
43 Id. § 8. Criminal consequences are those described as such in the criminal code. Id.
§ 9. Traditionally in the United States, if fatal force is received in one state and the victim
succumbs in another, jurisdiction obtains in the state in which the fatal force was received.
Perkins, supra note 5, at 1157. But see statutes cited and quoted in note 19 and 22 and see
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.03(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), which states, "[w]hen the
offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the bodily impact causing death consti-
tutes a 'result', within the meaning of Subsection (1)(a). .. ."
44 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8, 9, 29 (West 1974). This is what would occur in other
states also. Cf. Commonwealth v. MaCloon, 101 Mass. 1 (1869), in which jurisdiction was
obtained and a conviction of murder was upheld in Massachusetts, although the deceased
had been wounded on board a British vessel on the high seas but had died in Massachusetts.
Similarly, in Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 319 (1860), the State of Michigan asserted jurisdiction
over a homicide of a man who had been wounded on board an American flag vessel in Cana-
dian waters, but who died in Michigan. Of course, in this case, jurisdiction would also have
been appropriate on the basis of the fact that the crime had been committed upon an Ameri-
can flag vessel.
This is the type of offense that Glanville Williams has denominated a "terminatory of-
fense," because the offense is deemed to occur where the last constituent element occurs-in
the case of homicide, either the place of the receipt of the deadly force or the place of the
death, depending on the substantive definition of the crime. Williams, The Venue and Am-
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lar jurisdictional notions apply, medication connected with an illegal
abortion in another state, the latter state may prosecute the sender for
illegal procurement of an abortion.45  Traditionally in the United
States, however, if fatal force is received in one state and the victim
succumbs in another, in the absence of a statute, only the state where
the fatal force occurred has had jurisdiction over the homicide. 46
Even if the substantive definition of the crime does not conceive the
crime itself to occur where the criminal consequences occur, jurisdiction
can be obtained when the harmful effects take place within the territory
of the state claiming jurisdiction.47 One of the most interesting older
applications of the objective territorial principle is presented in Simp-
son a State,48 where the court severely strained the term "territory."
The defendant in this case stood in South Carolina and fired a gun at a
person who was in a boat on the part of the Savannah River which is
within the territorial boundaries of Georgia. The bullet missed its tar-
get, but did hit the water on the Georgia side of the river. The Georgia
courts held that they had subject matter jurisdiction to try the accused
for assault with intent to murder; they reasoned that the constructive
presence of the accused followed his bullet over to the Georgia side of
the river.
49
Thus, the basis for the expansion of jurisdiction over actions in vio-
bit of the Crimznal Law, 81 L.Q. REv. 518 (1965). It is what Professor Gordon calls a "result
offense," for obvious reasons. G. GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND (2d ed. 1978).
See also People v. Puig, 85 Misc. 2d 228, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
45 State v. Morrow, 40 S.C. 221, 18 S.E. 853 (1893). In this case, the woman who had
been sent the "medication" was killed in South Carolina as a result of its use. See State v.
Wells, 249 S.C. 249, 259, 153 S.E.2d 904, 909 (1967).
46 Perkins, supra note 5, at 1157 n.9 (citing the tragic case of State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499
(1859)). This was because the situs of the crime usually was considered to be the place where
the fatal force impinged on the victim. Perkins, supra note 5, at 1157; King v. Coombs, 168
Eng. Rep. 296 (1785); United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No.
14,932), cited in Perkins, supra note 5; cf. cases and statutes cited supra notes 22, 23 and 44.
47 People v. Adams, 3 Denio 190 (N.Y. 1846) aj'd, 1 Comst. 173 (N.Y. 1848); Lamar v.
United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916)Gurisdiction was held to have been asserted properly in New
York where the out-of-state phone call was received whereby the out-of-state defendant imper-
sonated an officer of the United States in order to defraud).
In Updike v. People, 92 Colo. 125, 18 P.2d 472 (1933), Colorado courts properly asserted
jurisdiction where the victim of a scheme to defraud posted in Colorado a letter and enclosed
a check from his account in Colorado to the defendant who was in Idaho.
See also Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 621 (1926); Benson v. Henkel, 198 U.S. 1
(1905); In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890).
48 Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893); see also Hyde v. United States, 225
U.S. 347 (1912); State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561 (1856).
49 In Louisiana and other states with similar definitions of assault, there would be no
difficulty if the defendant had been trying to put the victim in fear of receiving great bodily
harm or if the victim were actually put in fear of great bodily harm, since one of the defini-
tions of assault is the putting of a person in fear of receiving greatly bodily harm. See La. Rev.
Star. Ann. § 14:36 (West 1974).
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lation of United States antitrust laws has usually been the objective ter-
ritoriality principle, in so much as the effect of such violations occurs
within United States territory. 50 The same may be said of jurisdiction
over violations of the securities laws.5 1
United States federal or state tribunals have expansively used the
subjective and objective theories and have interpreted legislation to in-
50 E.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Bulova
Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.. 1945); British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 780; see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.
Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978), cited and discussed in Recent Developments- Sovereign Immunity Jurisdic-
tional Problems Involving the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Extratem'torial Application of United
States Antitrust Laws, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 835 (1980); International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, No.
78-5012-AAH(SX) (C.D. Calif. filed Sept. 18, 1979). See also W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COM-
MERCE AND ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973); K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD (1976); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977);
Note, Extrateritoraliy of Anti-trust and Other Commerce Acts, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 317
(1972); Note, E traterritoriality-Anti-trust Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 888 (1971); Note, Extraterrito-
ria Application ofAmerican Anti-lrusl Law and Export Expansion Act of 1971, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 531 (1972). Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the US Antitrust Laws, 1957 BRIT.
Y.B.I.L. 146, presents a critical view of the extension of United State jurisdiction of extraterri-
torial antitrust violations. See a/so Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] All
E.R. 434, in which the court particularly disagrees with this far-reaching extension of the
objective territorial theory.
See also Davidow, Extratenitorial Application of US Antitrust Law in a Changing World, 8
LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 895 (1976); Jones, Extraterritoriality in US Antitrust.: An International
"Hot Potato," 11 INT'L LAW. 415 (1977); Kintner & Griffin,Jurisdiction over Forezgn Commerce
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 199 (1977); Ongman, "Be No
Longer Chaos'" Constructing a Normative Theoy of the Sherman Act's Extratem'torial Jursdictional
Scope, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 733 (1977); Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct
Outside the United States.- A Viewfrom Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978); Klinowski,
Multinational Business Beware: The Long Arm of the United States Antitrust Laws May Reach You, 12
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 285 (1979); Note, Antitrust-Extraten7itorialJurisdiction Under the Efects Doc-
trine-A Conflicts Approach, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 354 (1977); Note, Conflicting Interpretations of
the Shennan Act rJurisdiction Requirement, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1215 (1979).
51 See discussion in VI M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 126-27, 118-60 (1963), and
antitrust cases and commentary in supra note 29. See also E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 684 (1967); Aileo ,JudicialRole in ExtrateitorialApplica-
lion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Vesco, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 192 (1974); Note, The
Extrateritorial Application of Section 10(b), and Rule 10-b-5, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 342 (1973); Note,
Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Laws Section 30(b) of Securities Exchange Act of
1931f-Liability of Foreign Insiders For Short-Swing Transactions in American Listed Securities: Roth v.
Fund of Funds, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 150 (1971). For more discussion on the extrater-
ritorial application of United States securities law, see Note, ExtrateritorialApplication of United
States Securities Laws, 42 Mo. L. REV. 158 (1977); Note, Securities Law-Subject MatterJurisdic-
tion in Transnational Securities Fraud, 9 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 113 (1976); Note, Securities
Transnational Application of Antftaud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws Expanded, 8 SETON
HALL L. REV. 795 (1977); Note, Securities Regulations-Extraterritorial Application of the Antijfraud
Provisions-Federal Securities Laws Grant Jurisdiction Where There is Some Activity in Furtherance of a
Fraudulent Scheme Committed Within the United States, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173 (1978);
Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Code: An Examination of the Role of Interna-
tional Law in American Courts, I1 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (1978).
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fer legislative intent to assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct
which violates federal or state law.52 The territorial theories, therefore,
have been extended liberally to mitigate the evils that would arise from
a strict application of the territorial basis of jurisdiction. 53 Thus, with
the ever expanding notion of territorial jurisdiction over extraterritorial
offenses in the United States, jurisdiction will be deemed appropriate as
long as the offense itself, its result or effect, or any of its constituent or
material elements occur within the sovereign territory of the United
States.5 4 The expansion of these territorial theories, however, has gone
52 Indeed, United States extension of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conspiracies is
clearly overtaking that of countries such as France, which has a reputation for extensive asser-
tion of jurisdiction. See discussion infra at notes 85- 131 and accompanying text. The discus-
sion in the following sections of this article will graphically indicate the extent to which
United States courts will go to find territorial jurisdiction. In United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94 (1922), jurisdiction was extended to cover fraudulent acts committed abroad which
were directly injurious to the United States government. Jurisdiction was actually based on
the nationality and protective principle, but the decision was couched in language suggesting
objective territoriality. Certainly, there is no reason that multiple theories would not be ap-
propriate upon the facts of Bowman. The defendants were charged with violating what is now
known as 18 U.S.C. §§ 80, 82-86. The offense was committed partly on the high seas, and
partly in the harbor at Rio de Janeiro. The statute was construed to cover these acts, al-
though the statute does not expressly state that it extends to offenses committed beyond the
territory of the United States. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this case. The court in United States ex rel Majka v. Palmer, 67 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1933),
applied similar reasoning to take jurisdiction over an act of perjury in Poland by an alien
seeking entry into the United States. II. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 202
(1963), reports a case wherein a United States' consul was prosecuted for accepting bribes in
Vancouver, Canada relating to a request for a visa from a Chinese citizen.
See also United States v. Johnson, 227 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1955), a 'd, 351 U.S. 215 (1956),
which held that one need not be physically present to be guilty of an offense within the
territory if the immediate result of the force set in motion outside the territory occurs within
the territory. See cases cited ntfa note 65.
53 The evils of the too strict application of the territorial principle are graphically
presented in the case of In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952), in which a United
States Army sergeant was charged with a murder that took place in Italy during World War
II. Since Italy did not assert jurisdiction over the crime involved and an Italian-American
treaty relative to extradition had no application because of jurisdictional issues, extradition
was never granted and the accused was never prosecuted. See also United States v. Icardi, 140
F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956); State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894).
54 One of the benefits of the expansion of the objective territoriality theories ofjurisdiction
is in their accomodation of the extradition process, which is rife with problems relating to
jurisdiction. For example, article I of the 1909 Extradition Treaty between France and the
United States, for example, provided that the governments "mutually agree to deliver up
persons who, having been charged with or convicted of any of the crimes or offenses specified
in the following article, committed within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting par-
ties. ... Arbitration Treaty, Jan. 6, 1909, United States-France, art. I, 37 Stat. 1526, T.S.
No. 561 [hereinafter cited as 1909 Extradition Treaty]; 7 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other Inter-
national Agreements of the United States of America 872 (1968). See also Supplementary
Convention to the Extradition Convention of January 6, 1909, Feb. 12, 1970, United States-
France, 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075 [hereinafter cited as Supplementary Convention of
1970]. See Blakesley, supra note 38, at 663. The language of the treaty has not been altered.
Thus, this treaty, on its face, could be construed to provide for jurisdiction to extradite when-
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too far.
ever an extraditable offense is committed in such a way as to trigger jurisdiction of either
contracting party as defined by the laws of either state. The term "jurisdiction" as used in
extradition treaties, however, was traditionally interpreted by United States courts and com-
mentators to connote territorial jurisdiction exclusively. See In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873)(No. 13,562). See also J. MOORE, Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the
Cutting Case, 1887 For. Rel 757 in 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw 232-40 (1906) (citing In re Stupp);
In re Stupp was also discussed in I J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTER-
STATE RENDITION 135 (1891) and in Pente, Principles of International Extradition in Latin
America, 28 MICH. L. REv. 665, 704 (1930); S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL
PRACTICE, 64 (1966). In In re Stupp, the court held that Stupp, a German subject, whose
extradition was asked by the German government for a crime committed in Belgium, should
be surrendered under the Treaty of Extradition of 1852, between the United States and Prus-
sia, which provided for surrender when the offense was committed "within the jurisdiction" of
either party. The Secretary of State declined the rendition based upon the recommendation
of the Attorney General. This article will show that notions regarding extraterritorial juris-
diction in United States law have been evolving.
The Attorney General of the United States' opinion on this matter written for the case of
In re Stupp, states:
I am quite clear that the words "committed within the jurisdiction," as used in the
treaty, do not refer to the personal liability of the criminal, but to the locali. The locus
delicti, the place where the crime is committed, must be within the jurisidiction of the
party demanding the fugitive.
14 Op. Att'y Gen. 281, 283 (emphasis in the original). The Attorney General's language
fairly sums up the traditional official United States' position on the interpretation of the term
"jurisdiction" in extradition treaties. This has been the consistent traditional AngloAmerican
interpretation of the term "jurisdiction." In 1931, for example, France requested extradition
from Great Britain, of a fugitive from French justice. The extradition was denied on jurisdic-
tional grounds. The court stated that the 1873 Convention of Extradition applies only to
crimes committed within the territory of the Power which is seeking extradition ....
[I]n their Lordships' opinion, no one of the appellants was liable to be extradited under
the treaty, unless the crime of which he was convicted was, in fact, committed within the
territory of the French Republic. Kossekechatko v. Attorney-General of Trinidad, An-
nual Digest of Public International Law Cases, years 1931-32, 302, 303 (1938).
French notions of jurisdiction clearly transcend the territorial concept. French law
provides for a rather broad authority for application of its criminal laws to events which
occur beyond its national territory and, thus, to prosecute and punish individuals who
have committed "extraterritorial offenses." Seee.g.,supra note 19.
Difficulties may arise when one of the parties attempts to extradite an offender who
has committed an extraditable offense deemed by the requesting state to be within its
notion of jurisdiction, but which would not be considered by the law of the requested
state to be within its jurisdiction under similar, but obverse, circumstances. For example,
if a French national accosted and robbed another French national on foreign soil, French
law may admit jurisdiction of its courts over the subject matter, as long as the courts
could obtain jurisdiction over the person. French courts could assert jurisdiction on the
basis of the nationality of either the accused or the victim. Under United States law and
its territorial interpretation of jurisdiction, on the other hand, extradition would be de-
nied. Blakesley, supra note 38, at 694. The drafters of the Supplementary Convention of
1970, between France and the United States, attempted to resolve the problem by ad-
ding the following provision:
Without prejudice to the jurisdictional provision of Article I of this Convention,
when the offense has been committed outside the territory of both contracting Par-
ties, extradition may be granted if the laws of the requested Party provide for the
punishment of such an offense committed in similar circumstances.
Supplementary Convention of 1970, supra at art. I. It would be chimerical to believe
that this article changes the traditional United States interpretation of the term jurisdic-
tion. Although this new article might appear to provide for an exception to the tradi-
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In 1927, in Fordv. UnitedStates,55 a case which may be seen today as
a precursor to the classic and widespread misapplication of the objective
territorial theory, the United States Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tion for conspiracy to violate United States liquor laws of several British
subjects who had been on board a British vessel on the high seas about
twenty-five miles off the coast of San Francisco at the time of the of-
fense.56 The assertion of jurisdiction actually was appropriate, as it was
made pursuant to a treaty between Great Britain and the United States
which authorized the seizure of vessels and the prosecution of British
subjects suspected of committing such offenses. Indeed, the Court
stated that since the parties were seen to be within United States juris-
diction by virtue of the specific treaty provision, they could not be pro-
ceeded against in any manner not permitted by the treaty.5 7 The Court
tional United States interpretation of the term "jurisidction" in extradition treaties, it
does not. If the drafters' purpose was to make such an exception, they essentially failed
by connecting jurisdiction for extraditability to the law of the requested party. In practi-
cal effect, this changes very little. It simply makes United States law on jurisdiction
determinative for most extradition requests. The provision would allow the United
States, the party with the most restrictive law of jurisdiction, to seek extradition from
France, the party with the more expansive law of jurisdiction and to apply the French
(the requested state's) law ofjurisdiction to determine extraditability. The United States
would not normally request extradition unless its more restricted laws on jurisdiction
would allow prosecution. The language also incorporates a strict adherence to the spe-
cial and general double criminality condition.
There appear to be at least two explanations for the wording of article I. The
United States negotiating team could have presented the article as an attempt to allow
the flexibility to expand the notion of jurisdiction for extradition beyond the territorial
principle as United States domestic law expands beyond that principle. Alternatively, it
could have been a bungled attempt to allow France to obtain jurisdiction over the person
through extradition, if the law of France allowed it over the subject matter, even when
United States law would not allow jurisdiction in similar circumstances. Either view is a
reversal of the judge-made principle that jurisdiction in extradition treaties means terri-
torial jurisdiction. This reversal would not have violated the language of article I on its
face.
It is likely that the former explanation is the more accurate. United States law on
jurisdiction over extra-territorial crimes has been expanding. This expansion is apparent
in relation to violations of: (1) antitrust laws, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); (2) securities laws, see Schoenbaum v. Firstbook,
405 F.2d 200, (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc);
(3) conspiracy to import narcotics, see United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Williams,
589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979) modifled, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Note, Drug Smuggling and the Protective
Principle: A Journey Into Unchartered Waters, 39 LA. L. REv. 1189 (1979). The United
States delegation proposed the additional article, and apparently both negotiating teams
agreed that the new clause would be helpful in countering narcotic and counterfeiting
offenses, areas in which United States courts have transcended the pure territorial theory
to take jurisdiction. The French delegation probably decided that a little expansion of
extraditability beyond the territorial principle, as previously required by the courts, is
better than none. Portions of this footnote were derived from Blakesley, supra note 38, at
664, 665.
55 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
56 Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors Jan. 23, 1924, United
States-Great Britain, 43 Stat. 1761, T.S. 685, 12 Bevans 414.
57 273 U.S. at 597.
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suggested, however, that the theory or jurisdiction was that of objective
territoriality. The Court, however, did not appear to believe strongly
this clearly mistaken suggestion. The Court felt constrained to state that
the conspiracy itself had its situs within the territory of the United
States. As discussed above, the objective territorial principle obtains
when the offense itself occurs outside the territory, but its harmful ef-
fect(s) or result(s) occur within the territory. Of course, a conspiracy
outside the sovereign territory, by definition, cannot have any effect
within the territory as it is an inchoate offense; it has no effect at all,
until the substantive offense to which the parties are conspiring has oc-
curred within the sovereign territory (or has occurred outside the terri-
tory with its own effects impacting within the territory).58
When a conspiracy is perceived not as an inchoate offense, but as a
harm in and of itself, it poses an interesting question as to where the
"harm" is perceived to occur. Is it in the place of the agreement or the
place of the intended impact or result of the agreement? Clearly, it
would be a strain on the objective territoriality theory to suggest that
this "harm" has impacted on the intended state the moment the agree-
ment is made outside the territory. It would appear that a new theory
of jurisdiction needs to be developed for such an offense.59 Indicating its
confusion or its need to find that the conspiracy itself had its situs within
the United States, the Court in Ford explained that the conspiracy to
import alcoholic liquor into the United States occurred among co-con-
spirators, some of whom were within and some beyond the sovereign
territory of the United States. These co-conspirators were, of course,
agents of each other for the purpose of the conspiracy. Indeed, four of
the overt acts giving rise to the conspiracy took place within the United
States territorial limits and all of them were designed to violate United
States law within United States territory. The Court then stated that in
such a case all are guilty of the offense of conspiracy to violate the
United States law, regardless of whether they are within or outside of
the country.60 The parties actually conspired, therefore, within the
United States. The Court thus established the conspiracy as one which
58 Of course the purpose of having a crime of conspiracy is to prevent the effects from
occurring by attaching a sanction to the undesirable activity very early in its development. It
is the potential effects that we wish to prevent. Nevertheless, the objective territorial theory is
not appropriate for this prophilaxis, since no effect occurs within the territory. If the poten-
tial effect is what triggers the jurisdiction, some other theory needs to be asserted, unless we
are to fictionalize territoriality to the point of rendering it insignificant. Perhaps a hybrid
(objective territorial/protective principle) theory needs to be developed, wherein the state's
jurisdiction may be asserted when the conspiracy has reached a point at which it is clear that
the effects of the conspiracy would affect the territory if intervention does not occur. Such a
theory will be presented below.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 157-89.
60 273 U.S. at 620.
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actually has its situs within the United States. Although the Court used
the term, this is not an example of the objective territorial theory! The
cases the Court cited as supporting its position on objective territoriality
are also telling in their indication that the Court did not clearly under-
stand the objective territorial theory. In all of the cases the effcts of the
extraterritorial crimes were not only intended to occur within the
United States territory, but actually did occur there.6' Courts in the
United States have subsequently taken the Ford dictum and its confused
analysis as authority and rationale for the proposition that extraterrito-
rial conspiracies which have not yet caused any harmful effects to occur
within United States territory, but which are intended to do so, trigger
an application of the objective territorial principle of jurisdiction. 62
This interpretation certainly goes beyond the holding in Ford or its cited
authority.
Because it is not conceptually proper under international law to
apply the objective territorial theory in such situations, there is a need to
find or develop a theory which would allow the assertion of jurisdiction
when one cannot find that the conspiracy actually had its situs within
the United States and when no effect has occurred within the territory.
The question is whether or not there is a theory which will allow legisla-
tures in the United States to promulgate legislation (consistent with
proper conceptualization of international jurisdiction theory) which will
properly extend jurisdiction over certain extraterritorial conspiracies in-
tended to and about to cause harmful effects within the United States.
Objective territoriality clearly is not the proper vehicle. Before present-
ing a new theory of jurisdiction which may resolve the problem, it is
necessary to consider the protective principle which will form one of the
new theory's components and which has been suggested as a vehicle on
its own for the assertion of jurisdiction in such cases.
III. THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE
The discussion of the territorial principle together with the nation-
ality principle 63 suggests that whatever theory of jurisdiction over extra-
61 The Ford Court cites Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); Strassheim v. Daily,
221 U.S. 280 (1911); Benson v. Henkel, 198 U.S. 1 (1905)(a bribe was offered in California,
but received in Washington, D.C., where jurisdiction over the subject matter was properly
asserted, on the basis of the objective territoriality principle); In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257
(1890) (jurisdiction was deemed proper in the place where a letter was received over an offense
perpetrated by letter); Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893); Commonwealth v.
Macloon, 101 Mass. 1 (1869).
62 For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 85-133 and accompanying text.
63 In addition to the traditional (essentially territorial) function of keeping the peace, one
of the functions of a municipal criminal justice system is simply to control its citizens conduct;'
to prohibit and attempt to limit conduct deemed to be socially harmful. This may be con-
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territorial offenses is applied, an important motivation is the protection
of the forum state. However, the fact that self-protection was the motive
for assertion of jurisdiction does not by itself place the assertain within
trasted with the policy of keeping the King's peace, which obviously is the essence of territori-
ality. This function may be considered necessary and apt whether or not the conduct occurs
within or without the state's territory. There have been periods in which the factor which
determined the incidence of municipal criminal law was the citizenship or non-citizenship of
the accused offender. See Feller, supra note 5, at 5, 12. This may still be found today. Soviet
citizens are subject to Soviet criminal law regarding their conduct wherever it occurs. Id. at
12 n.5.
The United States Supreme Court recognized very early in its history the existence of the
power to punish offenses committed extraterritorially by United States nationals. Rose v.
Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808)(dictum). See also Address of Chief Justice John
Marshall before the United States House of Representatives, 1820 (text in full quoted in 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) app. I; Henfield's Case, I1 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360)).
The application of any statute to extraterritorial offenses is exceptional to the territorial
principle and the determination must be made on a case by case basis, since the United States
Congress has never made a general rule relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Note, supra
note 21 at 348-49. The Supreme Court attempted to lay down a general rule of statutory
interpretation with regard to extraterritorial offense in United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1922), discussed at supra note 19. It has not, however, become a general rule. But see a
legislative attempt to establish a general rule in S. 1772, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1979)
and H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111(c) (1979).
Certain specific statutes expressly apply to offenses committed by nationals abroad. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1948), punishes unauthorized attempts by United States nationals
"wherever they may be" to influence a foreign government in its relations with the United
States. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (1948) ("whoever incites, sets on foot, or assists or engages in
any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States" shall be fined or
imprisoned, but statute gives no limitation or jurisdiction); 18 U.S.C. 2388 (1948), (applies to
activites affecting American armed forces during war, specifically applies to offenses commit-
ted on the high seas as well as in United States territory. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1970), is incorpo-
rated by reference into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17(e)(2), and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 45(e)(2). They incorporate a provision that a United
States court may order the issuance of a subpoena requiring the appearance as a witness of
any "national or resident of the United States who is in a foreign country." Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (held "[d]omicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an
absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judg-
ment by means of appropriate substituted service').
Payments, promises to pay and authorizations of the payment of any money or anything
of value to any foreign official or foreign political party to assist in obtaining or retaining
business with a foreign concern is prohibited under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 30 A, 78 (dd-1), 78(e) (1976). Under the Act "any employee or agent of
such domestic concern who is a United States citizen, national, or resident, or person who is
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is subject to the provisions of the
Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(dd-2), 104(b)(1)(B)(3). Interestingly, the Act requires that "an instru-
mentality of interstate commerce" be used in furtherance of the proscribed activity or scheme.
15 U.S.C. § 103, 104. This establishes an interesting territorial connection to go along with
the nationality or personal basis of jurisdiction. Apparently, any United States citizen, na-
tional, or resident conducts business with the benefit of the mails or other instrumentality of
interstate commerce in a country in which certain government officials above the prescribed
rank are "known" to be corrupt or if one "has reason to know" they are corrupt, one has
violated the Act and would be subject to criminal sanction. See Note, Questionable Payments by
Foreign Subsidiaries: The Extraterritorial Jurisdictional EFect of the Foreign Cormpt Practices Act of
1977, 3 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 151, 156 (1979); Note, Compiarison of the Foreign
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the theoretical ambit of the protective principle. Nor does the fact that
some harm was done to the forum state as an effect of the extraterrito-
rial offense render the assertion of jurisdiction a manifestation of the
protective principle.64 Rather, to come under the protective principle,
Corrupt Practices Act and the Draft International Agreement on Illicit Payment, 13 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 795 (1980).
This article does not consider the interesting problems related to the impact of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act on conduct by foreign subsidiaries of United States entitites
through sanctioning the parent entity. In this regard see Note, Questionable Payments by Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 151, (1980). See also The
Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2412 (1978 & Supp. 1981), which
provides another example of United States legislative application of the nationality principle.
Section 2403 dealing with prohibited acts provides:
(a) In general.-It is unlawful- (1) for any United States citizen, unless authorized by
regulation prescribed under this chapter or a permit issued under section 2404 of
this title-
(A) to take within Antarctica any native mammal or native bird,
(B) to collect within any specially protected area any native plant,
(C) to introduce into Antarctica any animal or plant that is not
indigenous to Antarctica,
(D) to enter any specially protected area or site of special scientific
interest, or
(E) to discharge, or otherwise to dispose of, any pollutant within
Antarctica;
(2) for any United States citizen wherever located, or any foreign person while
within the United States, unless authorized by regulation prescribed under this chapter
or a permit issued under section 2404 of this title-
(A) to possess, sell, offer for sale, deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship by
any means whatsoever, or
(B) to import into the United States, to export from the United States, or to
attempt to so import or export, any native mammal or native bird taken in Antarctica or
any native plant collection in any specially protected area ....
16 U.S.C. § 2403 (1976 & Supp. 1981)(emphasis added). Section 2410 dealing with the jur-
sidiction of courts provides, "[t]he district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under the provisions of this chapter or of any
regulation prescribed, or permit issued under this chapter." 16 U.S.C. § 2410, (1976, & Supp.
1981).
State and federal treason statutes similarly provide for application of jurisdiction for
extraterritorial commission of the offense. The federal statute declares, "[w]hoever, owing
allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving
them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2381 (1970). See also Kawakita v. United States 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Chandler v. United
States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert.denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949) (both cases holding that
American citizens living abroad may be found guilty of treason). Another statutory provision
is noteworthy. The Internal Revenue Code imposes an income tax on "all citizens of the
United States wherever resident." I.R.C. § 1 (1976). Vermont's fairly typical treason statute
states that "a person owing allegiance to this state, who levies war or conspires to levy war
against the same, or adheres to the enemies thereof, giving them aid and comfort, within the
state or elsewhere, shall be guilty of treason against this state." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3401 (1974). See also supra discussion in note 19.
64 Cf. Professor Perkins' dicussion in his excellent article, The Territorial Principle in Criminal
Law, supra note 5, at 1163, of the Hanks Case, 13 Tex. App. 289 (1882), in which he states
that the Texas statute relied on by Texas for jurisdiction over a forgery done in Louisiana,
which had caused a cloud over Texas land titles, was, nevertheless, an application of the
protective principle because the forgery "could not by any extension be brought under the
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the offense must have harmful or possibly harmful effects to specific na-
tional interests of the forum state.
Most United States courts and commentators confuse or at least fail
to distinguish the objective territorial theory and the protective princi-
ple. Often, the courts' language will indicate that the objective territo-
rial theory was the basis of an assertion of jurisdiction when the facts
make it clear that the protective principle was the true basis. Other
times, the protective principle will be the articulated basis when the
facts indicate that the objective territorial principle would have been the
proper theory.6 5 Before analyzing the extent of this confusion and at-
tempting to resolve it, discussion of the concepts of the protective princi-
ple and universal theory of jursidiction are required.
Notwithstanding many courts' and commentators' failure to per-
ceive, -hesitancy to accept, or confusion there is a clear distinction be-
tween the protective and the objective/subjective territoriality
principles. If the theories are to retain any integrity, the distinction
must be observed. The objective territorial theory provides for jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed wholly outside the forum state's territory,
territorial principle." 13 Tex. App. at 290. It is true that this would have been a matter of
the protective principle if, indeed, there had been no impact on Texas land titles (only the
potential of impact) and if, andonly if, the effect on the land titles would be injurious to Texas'
security, integrity, treasury or governmental function. No doubt, this could have been. On
the other hand, it certainly could have been an application of the objective territorial princi-
ple if an impact on the titles had actually occurred. Indeed, the language used by the Texas
court appears to indicate that the harm, at least in the perception of the court, had actually
occurred in Texas. The court believed that jurisdiction was proper, "when this forgery was
committed against, andh'njug done to the State of Texas, because it aJfcted title to lands within
her sovereignty." 13 Tex. App. at 291 (emphasis added).
65 A good example of court confusion or at least hesitancy to apply the protective princi-
ple is Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961), in
which the accused alien had made false statements to a consular official of the United States
abroad. The conviction was affirmed and the court articulated the protective principle as the
basis for properly assertingjurisdiction. The assertion ofjurisdiction was correct because such
conduct certainly does harm governmental functions and could well injure or be a danger to
security of sovereignty. The interesting feature of the case, however, is the court's compulsion
to explain that a major element of the appropriateness of the assertion of jurisdiction was the
adverse effects of the defendant's entrance into the United States. This hesitancy, or more
likely the confusion, has become rampant in the past few years. See, e.g., United States v.
Jonas, 639 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 902 (1981); United States v. Arpa, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1981); United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668,(5th Cir:
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.
1979), modified, 617 F.2d 1063 (1980); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown, 549 F.2d 954
(4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.) cert. deniedsub nom., Parks v.
United States, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); United States v. Streifel, 507 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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when the effects or results of those crimes occur within the territory. 66
The subjective territorial theory provides for jurisdiction over crimes in
which a material element has occurred within the territory. 67 The pro-
tective principle, on the other hand, provides for jurisdiction over of-
fenses committed wholly outside the territory of the forum state even
when no effect occurs within the territory, but only when these actions
potentially have adverse effect on or pose a danger to the state's security,
integrity, sovereignty, or governmental function.68 There may be some
66 See supra discussion at notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
67 See supra discussion at notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
68 United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), is a case which most accurately
articulates this distinction. An alien was convicted of knowingly making false statements
under oath in a visa application to a United States consular officer in Canada. The court was
careful to point out that the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1976), took place entirely in Ca-
nada; the accused's entering the United States was not an element of the offense. Compare to
the Ninth Circuit's apparent compulsion to articulate some territorial base for jurisdiction in
Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961). In Pizzarusso, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was careful to indicate that it was the potential damage to
institutions or governmental functions or national interests that provided the basis for juris-
diction under the protective principle.
Interestingly, in United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the district
court refused to convict the accused defendant for providing false information to a consular
officer abroad. It held that withholding information and falsifying information relating to
immigration into the United States does not provide jurisdiction to United States courts. It
distinguished United States rx rel. Majka v. Palmer, 67 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1933), in which an
alien was deported for perjury in similar circumstances. The Baker court explained the juris-
diction taken to deport for perjury "is far different from indicting and trying him for crime
committed abroad." 136 F. Supp. at 548. See also United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708
(S.D. Cal. 1943). In Archer, an alien was convicted under 22 U.S.C. § 131 (1976), for commit-
ting perjury before a United States consul or diplomatic officer. The District Court for the
Southern District of California stated:
The Congress having thus conferred on its consular representatives the right to adminis-
ter an oath, to make effective, it had to attach a punishment to its abuse. . . . First, the
consul is given the power to take the oath. Then, the section declares that the oath shall
be as effective as if given by a magistrate having similar powers, within the United
States. And then, as a final provision, to make it effective, a penalty is provided by the
clause reading, "if any person . . . obtains an advantage in the United States, by secur-
ing by means of an oath taken before a consul, a document which has validity in the
United States, be guilty of perjury, as that word is defined at common law, punishment
is provided." If perjury has thus been committed, the offense is not committed in a
foreign territory. It consists in having corruptly secured an advantage, and in harming the
United States. The fraud is not in the act, but in the result to be attained. It is a sound principle
of criminal law that such a result may be punished. . . . 51 F. Supp. 709-10. (emphasis
added).
In Archer, as in many other obvious applications of the protective principle, the court felt
constrained to couch its opinion in terms similar to those of the territorial principle. Even
though the district court argues that offenses violating the sovereignty of the United States
may be punished, as if they were exceptions to the territorial principle, it felt constrained to
state that the offense was "not committed in a foreign territory," but on the United States, as
"the fraud is not in the act, but in the result to be obtained." 55 F. Supp. at 709-10. Even
though no frank admission of the exception to the territorial principle is made, the exception
exists in the protective or injured forum principle.
In United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), afdsub nom. Rocha v.
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overlap between the objective territorial principle and the protective
theory: when an effect actually occurs (but it is upon the abstraction of
sovereignty or of state integrity or it impinges upon some governmental
function) either or both of the theories may be appropriate, depending
on whether or not the effect is perceived to fall upon some territorial
siyts as well. It may be said that the objective and subjective territorial
theories are extensions of the territorial principle, while the protective
principle is an exception to it, since the latter does not require an actual
effect to occur within the territory.
The protective principle has been clearly defined as the authority to
prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its
territory that threatens [the state's] security as a state or the operation of its
governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a
crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.
6 9
The focus of this theory or principle of jurisdiction, therefore, is the na-
ture of the interest that may be injured, rather than the place of the
harm or the place of the conduct causing the harm or, for that matter,
the nationality of the perpetrator.7 0 Thus, lying to a consular outside of
the United States territory may be perceived as constituting "an affront
to the very sovereignty of the United States,' ' 7 1 and as having "a delete-
rious influence on valid governmental interests. '72 The protective theory
is designed to allow a state to protect itself and to punish the perpetra-
United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), the district court cited the Archer decision as
authority for denying the defendant's motion to dismiss charges of making false statements
before a consular officer. The court observed that an offense is within the scope of the protec-
tive theory, "when the detrimental effect takes place through the effect upon the sovereignty
of the state," 182 F. Supp. at 494 and it explicitly disagreed with the district court's opinion in
United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
See also the following decisions which do not mention the protective principle by name,
but whose language strongly suggests it as the essential theory of jurisdiction in the cases:
State of Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289, 290 (1888); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362 (1824); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 269 (1808); Rivard v. United
States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967); But see American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347 (1909) (held that the only proper base for jurisdiction in United States law is the
territorial theory). See also J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 425.1-425.3
(1935).
69 United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 33 (1965)). See also, Harvard Research, supra note 5,
at 543; RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402(3).
70 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402(3); Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 543.
71 United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 9-10.
72 Id. at 10. A small minority of courts and some commentators, criticizing the confusion
reigning among many of the federal circuits, have suggested that the protective principle
alone applies to potential damage. Pizzarusso appears to suggest this. Id. See also Note, Drug
Smuggling and the Protective Pinciple: A Jourve into Unchartered Waters, 39 LA. L. REv. 1189
(1979). This is not absolutely accurate, however, in as much as damage actually done to the
abstraction of sovereignty or the institutions or functions of government would be an appro-
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tors of actual and inchoate offenses which damage or threaten to dam-
age state security, sovereignty, treasury, or governmental function. It is
the only accepted theory which allows jurisdiction over conduct which
threatens potential danger to the above-mentioned abstractions or func-
tions. Because of the significant dangers the protective principle poses
to relations among nations, application of the theory is limited to those
recognized and stated abstractions or functions. 73 With very few excep-
tions, national penal codes throughout the world recognize this principle
and its limitations. 74
priate trigger for the protective principle. Of course, it is very difficult to determine whether
or not such damage has actually occurred. Thus, potential damage or danger is sufficient.
See, RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, §§ 402-03, which refines § 33 of the old Restate-
ment but retains the traditional bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This refinement will be
discussed in detail infra in text accompanying notes 147-77. With regard to the protective
principle, Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 440, describes the traditional theory:
7. A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by
an alien against the security, territorial integrity or political independence of that
state, provided that the act or omission which constitutes the crime was not commit-
ted in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place where it was
committed.
8. A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by
an alien which consists of falsification or counterfeiting, or an uttering of falsified
copies or counterfeits, of the seals, currency, instrument or credit, stamps, passports,
or public documents, issued by the state or under its authority.
The RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402(3), provides that jurisdiction to prescribe
obtains with regard to "Certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals
which is directed against the security of the state or certain state interests."
73 United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10; United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252,
1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.C.P.R. 1978); Note,
supra note 72, at 1193.
74 See, e.g., C. Pr. Pn. art. 694; Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 543, 547-51; Shavia &
Bishop, The Authori of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and Places, in MANUAL OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, 363-64 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968).
Probably the most famous international case actually involving the principle of objective
territoriality also involved, and well illustrates, the protective principle. S.S Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (judgment of Sept. 7). The Lotus case stands for the
principle of objective territoriality (perhaps including the floating territorial principle). In
the Lotus case, Turkey prosecuted and convicted the French officer of the French flag
merchant vessel, the Lotus, for manslaughter. The Lotus had collided with the Turkish flag
vessel, the Boz-Kourt, causing much property damage and the loss of eight Turkish lives.
France objected to the Turkish prosecution, claiming that Turkey had no basis for jurisdic-
tion under any principle of international law. France and Turkey submitted the dispute to
the Permanent Court of International Justice for resolution of this dispute over jurisdiction.
France argued that an officer of a ship on the high seas can only be held to obey the laws
and regulations of the flag state and that international law prohibited Turkey from taking
jurisdiction simply by reason of the nationality of the victims; France argued that the passive
personality principle was not sufficient for Turkey to take jurisdiction. The Permanent Court
of International Justice declined to decide the passive personality issue, but held that Tur-
key's assumption ofjurisdiction could be predicated on the fact that the effects had occurred
on the Boz-Kourt, which, being a Turkish flag vessel, was a place assimilated to Turkish
territory for the purposes of the case. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at 86. This type of
jurisdiction may more aptly be called the "floating objective territorial principle." See Emp-
son, The Application of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside the Jurisdiction, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q.
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In sum, foreign and domestic commentators have considered the
United States traditionally to be essentially adherents of the territorial
theory. However, adherence to a strict interpretation of territorial juris-
diction has been tempered by fictional extension of the concept of terri-
toriality, via the objective and subjective territorial theories, and by
exception to it in theories such as the protective principle.
IV. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
International law provides that there are certain offenses for which
any nation may assert jurisdiction once the nation obtains personal ju-
risdiction over the accused; such offenses are those so heinous that any of
the community of nations may prosecute. The most ancient offense of
universal interest is probably piracy. With regard to universal jurisdic-
tion over piracy, Hackworth writes: "It has long been recognized and
well-settled that persons and vessels engaged in piratical operations on
the high seas are entitled to the protection of no nation and may be
punished by any nation that may apprehend or capture them."' 75 The
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, in 1958, article 19, states:
32 (1967); George, £xtraterriton'al Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 609, 613
(1966). The French and the dissent in the case argued that the law of the flag-vessel should
govern the pilot. This position was later adopted by two major international conventions
relating to navigation on the high seas and probably reflects customary international law
today. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980); D. HARRIS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAv 93 (2d ed. 1979). The French opposition to
the assertion of jurisdiction in cases occurring on vessels on the high seas eventually won out,
at least with regard to the signatories at the 1952 Brussels International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collisions or other
Incidents of Navigation. The parties to this convention were: Szgnatories: Germany, Belgium,
Brazil, Denmark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Monaco, Nicaragua, Yugo-
slavia; Ratifcations: United Kingdom, France, Spain, Yugoslavia, Vatican, Egypt, Portugal,
Belgium, Argentina; Accessions: Switzerland, Costa Rica, Cambodia, French Overseas Terri-
tories, the Republic of Togo and the Cameroons, Haiti, Vietnam. Quoted in 4 BRITISH SHIP-
PING LAWS COLLISIONS AT SEA No. 1285, 902-03 (McGuffie ed. 1961); 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 11, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention], states:
1. In the event of a collision or of any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on
the high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or any
other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be
instituted against such persons except before the judicial or administrative authori-
ties either of the flag state or of the state of which such a person is a national.
2. In disciplinary matters, the state which has issued a masters certificate or a certificate
of competence or license shall alone be competent. After due legal process, to pro-
nounce the withdrawal of such certificates, even if the holder is not a national of the
state which issued them.
3. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation shall be ordered
by any authorities other than those of the flag state.
Quoted in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 240 (1968).
75 2 G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 681 (1940). See R. MERLE & A. VITU,
TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL 319 (1967).
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On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by
piracy and under pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on
board. The courts of the State which carried out the seize may decide
upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be
taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of
third parties acting in good faith.
76
In addition to piracy, several other crimes are of universal or nearly
universal interest. These crimes, many of which have been made sub-
jects of international conventions aimed at their elimination, include
slave trading,77 war crimes,78 highjacking and sabotage of civil air-
craft, 79 genocide,80 and terrorism.8 t There is a growing trend to include
76 Geneva Convention, supra note 74, at art. 19. See, Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piray Obso-
lete? 38 HARV. L. REV. 334 (1925); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (Wheat) 1, 40 (1826): "Pi-
rates may, without doubt, be lawfully captured on the ocean by the public or private ships of
every nation; for they, are in truth, the common enemies of all mankind, and, as such, are
liable to the extreme rights of war."
77 Geneva Convention, supra note 74, at arts. 13, 22.
78 See generalo T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM (1970); U.S. ARMY, DEPART-
MENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL, FM 27-10 (rev. ed. 1976); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1946); United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); Bond, Application of/he Law of War to
International Conflicts, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 345 (1973); Taubenfeld, The Applicability of the
Laws of War in CIVIL WAR, IN LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 499 (J. Moore
ed. 1974); H. KISSINGER, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 1454, 1460 (1979).
79 See Tokyo Convention (Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on
board aircraft), Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768; The Hague Convention
(for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S.
No. 7192. The Hague Convention's major provisions create "universal" jurisdiction for signa-
tories for prosecution of hijackers; the signatories have the obligation either to prosecute or
extradite. The Hague Convention, supra at arts. 1, 4. Montreal Convention (Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation), Sept. 23, 1971, 24
U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 7570. See French L. 72-623, of July 5, 1972. 32 Gazette du Palais (Leg-
islation) 360 (1972) which provides:
Art. L. 121-7. French courts have jurisdiction over any infraction committed aboard an
airplane registered in France. They have jurisdiction as well over any
crime or tort committed against such plane outside of the French
territory.
Art. L. 121-8. French courts have jurisdiction with respect to a crime or a tort commit-
ted aboard a plane which is not registered in France when the author or
the victim has French nationality, when the plane lands in France after
the commission of the crime or tort, or when the infraction was commit-
ted aboard a plane which is rented without crew to a person who has his
principal place of establishment or, if there be none, his permanent resi-
dence in France.
Moreover, in case a plane is forced off its course (i.e. hijacked) which
is not registered in France, French courts have jurisdiction over the in-
fraction and over every other act of violence against the passengers or the
crew done by the person alleged to have forced the plane off its course in
the commission of (literally, in direct relationship to) the offense, when
the person is found in France.
Cited and translated in N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 278 (1973). See also 49 U.S.C. § 1472(k)(2)(1976), which states:
whoever, while aboard an aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
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trafficking in narcotic drugs to the list.82 Universal interest in the sup-
pression of trafficking in narcotic drugs is moving toward, but has not
yet reached, sufficient intensity to warrant recognition, either on the ba-
sis of custom or universal participation in international agreement. 83 In
some instances, however, countries are obligated either to extradite or
prosecute narcotics law violators, aircraft hijackers, and counterfeiters,
pursuant to treaty obligations, if the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the requesting state.84
V. RECENT EXTENSTION OF THE BASES OF JURISDICTION OVER
EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIME IN UNITED STATES LAW
Courts and commentators in the United States, with some notable
exceptions,8 5 have improperly extended the bases of jurisdiction over ex-
traterritorial crime. In so doing, they have failed to perceive or have
been reticent to apply or articulate a clear distinction between the pro-
tective and objective territoriality principles. 86 The Restatement Drajf has
followed the trend of United States courts in this error.8 7 The cases and
the Restatement Draft inappropriately designate the extension as being
within the ambit of the objective territorial principle. Section 402(l)(c)
of the Restatement Draft provides that jurisdiction over an extraterritorial
crime will obtain when it "has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its [the United States] territory. ' 88 The court cases provide es-
States, commits an act, which, if committed in the District of Columbia would be in
violation of section 9 of the Act entitled "An Act for the preservation of the public peace
and the protection of property within the District of Columbia," (citation omitted), shall
be punished as provided therein. See Sevenson, International Law and the Export of Terror-
ism, 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 645 (1972).
80 Genocide Convention (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide), Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1957). The United
States Government, although instrumental in developing the convention, has not yet received
the advice and consent of the Senate. See 62 DEP'T ST. BULL. 350 (1970) wherein the Secre-
tary of State urges its ratification.
81 See Drafting of International Convention Against Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 1456; European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Dec. 4, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 325;
United Nations Resolution Regarding Terrorism, 14 U.N. GAOR at 355, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/3034 (1972). The United States voted against the document for not being strong
enough. See, 68 DEP'T ST. BULL. 81 (1973); Convention on Terrorism, Feb. 2, 1971, 27
U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413 (entered into force for United States on Oct. 20, 1976).
82 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NARCOTICS AND
DANGEROUS DRUGS (1972). This study discusses 12 international agreements dating from
1909 to 1961 on the control of narcotics.
83 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 34, reporter's note 2, at 97.
84 See, e.g., supra notes 79 & 81.
85 E.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1968); Note, supra note 72, at
1189.
86 See supra notes 38-74 and accompanying text.
87 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402(1)(c).
88 Id. (emphasis added).
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sentially the same conceptualization. The following three sections of
this article will analyze this trend to indicate that although the cases
and the Restatement Draft provide the appropriate result and attempt
properly to allow jurisdiction in cases of thwarted extraterritorial con-
spiracy, they make a conceptual error in placing the extension within
the objective territorial theory. It would theoretically be more accurate
and more consistent with traditional international law if the extension
was recognized as being based upon a new hybrid theory of jurisdiction,
derived from policies underlying the objective territorial, the protective
principle, and the universality theories of jurisdiction. 9
The trend of United States courts to extend the bases of jurisdiction
began seriously with the the United States Supreme Court's inappropri-
ate articulation of the objective territorial principle as the basis for juris-
diction in Ford v. United States, as discussed above.90 Another very good
example of the inaccurate application of the objective territorial theory
is in Rocha v. United States.9 ' Although the Rocha facts were perfect for
the application of the protective theory, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals felt constrained to articulate a territorial basis for jurisdiction. An
accused alien had made false statements to a consular official abroad.
The district court had convicted the accused and the court of appeals
properly upheld the conviction. The facts clearly show that the ac-
cused's conduct certainly violated the integrity of United States govern-
mental operations and was an insult to its sovereignty, if not a danger to
its security. Nevertheless, the appellate court explained that a major
reason for its assertion of jurisdiction was the fact that United States
territory had been adversely impacted upon when the defendant entered
illegally. The offense, of course, was making false statements to a consu-
lar official; this occurred entirely extraterritorially. The interesting fea-
ture of the case is the court's need to emphasize the objective territorial
theory.
Similarly, in United States v. Archer,92 the Southern District of Cali-
fornia properly asserted jurisdiction and applied United States law to
convict an alien of committing perjury to a consular official abroad.
The court made a statement suggesting the protective principle: "[the
89 Some may suggest that the Restatement Draft creates a new basis ofjurisdiction pursu-
ant to the "Rule of Reasonableness" (similar to that in conflicts cases) which finds the state
with the most significant interest in the crime to be the proper one for jurisdiction. This
writer believes that the Restatement Draft does not actually do this, but recognizes the tradi-
tional bases of jurisdiction. The Rule of Reasonableness is a mechanism of imitation, not
expansion.
90 Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927), see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying
text for a detailed discussion of this case.
91 Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
92 United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
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fraud] consists in having corruptly secured an advantage, and in harm-
ing the United States. The fraud is not in the act, but in the result [the
advantage or harm] to be attained. '93 The court, nevertheless, felt con-
strained to couch its opinion in terms suggesting the objective territorial
theory. Even though the Court argued well that offenses violating the
sovereignty of the United States (absent territorial situs) may be pun-
ished as if they were exceptions to the territorial principle, the court
stated that, "the offense was not committed in a foreign territory," but
in the United States.94 Even though the protective principle would
have been a proper and sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction, the
courts felt constrained to apply the objective territorial theory.
The confusion or misapplication of the objective territorial theory
has been taken to greater lengths more recently, especially in cases relat-
ing to the crime of conspiracy to import narcotics, in which the parties
are arrested and the conspiracy thwarted beyond the United States ter-
ritorial limits. 95 The courts have factually perceived the problem in four
conceptual forms. First, as in the Ford case, 96 courts have construed the
facts to find that the conspiracy actually took place or had effects within
United States territory. If the situs is found to be within United States
territory, this poses no problem for the purposes of this section of the
article.9 7 Nor does the related method of finding that the offense which
has occurred upon a United States flag vessel essentially has occurred on
United States territory. This is an application of the so-called floating-
territorial principle. 98 A third related method of conceptualizing the
93 Id. at 710.
94 Id. See also United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491-92 (S.D. Cal. 1960) and
other cases cited supra note 68. But see United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 549
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), wherein the court refused jurisdiction because, "providing false information
to a consular officer abroad" does not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. The court did not recognize the protective principle as a basis for taking jurisdiction.
95 See cases cited supra note 65 and those discussed infra notes 106-53 and accompanying
text.
96 273 U.S. 593, 619 (1927).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Coats,
611 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1979).
98 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); see Empson, SUpra note 6, at 32; George, supra
note 74, at 613; cited in Note, supra note 6, at 404, n.3.
In the Wildenhus case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887), a Belgian national was on board a Belgian ship
in port at Jersey City. The decision stated that if there is a treaty, and perhaps even by
comity, the flag-ship authority through its consular offices controls in situations of offenses on
board ship, except that when the offense endangers the repose of the port, local United States
authority can intervene. Most countries as well as the United States provide for the assertion
ofjurisdiction over offenses committed aboard their respective flag vessels on the high seas or
flag aircraft in international airspace. See, e.g., FR. C. L'AvIATION Civ., Decr. no. 67-333, of
March 30, 1967, D. 1967, at 184; B.L.D. 1967, at 320; C. L'AVIATION Civ., art L. 121-7, L. no.
72-623, of July 5, 1972; L. 121-8, L. no. 76-450 of May 24, 1976; L. 121-9, L. no. 72-623, of
July 5, 1972; cited and quoted in CODE DE PROCtDURE PNALE, following art. 689; V. KOER-
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facts to legitimize the assertion of jurisdiction is to determine that a sig-
nificant or constituent element of the offense has occurred within United
States territory, but that the offense was actually consummated
abroad.99 This is an obvious application of the subjective territorial the-
ory, although the courts often inaccurately describe the basis for their
taking jurisdiction as that of the objective territorial principle. 0 0 Fi-
nally, the perception which causes the major conceptual problems and
which will be the main focus of this portion of the article, allows for
jurisdiction when no element or effect of the conspiracy occurs within
United States territory.
The subjective territorial theory is often a valid vehicle for the
assertion of legislative, judicial and enforcement jurisdiction over con-
spiracies which culminate or are thwarted abroad, since all that is re-
quired for competent use of that theory is that a constituent element of
the offense occur within the territorial limits of the United States. I0 ' If
the courts consider that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is
"'a constituent element" of the crime, the subjective territorial principle
properly applies. Until very recently, the courts have considered an
overt act by at least one of the conspirators within United States terri-
tory necessary before jurisdiction could be obtained. The theoretical
problem in most of these cases is that the courts have articulated, as the
basis of their taking jurisdiction, the objective rather than the subjective
territorial theory. 0 2 Where no harmful effects actually occur within the
territory- no contraband actually smuggled in, for example-the ob-
jective territorial principle, as it has traditionally been conceptualized,
clearly cannot be the proper theory for the assertion of jurisdiction. An
ING-JOULIN, DALLOZ JURISCLASSEUR DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS DE Lois ET DE
COMPLTENCE §§ 9-25 (1977). Article 696 of the French Code de Procedure P~nale provides a
legislative basis for jurisdiction over offenses in application of international conventions. It
extends jurisdiction over "crimes, delits, and contraventions," committed extraterritorially for
which an international convention, signed and ratified by France, attributes jurisdiction to
France. C. Pr. Pen. art. 696. There are several conventions of this type which have entered
into force in the past decade. E.g., the Hague Convention for the Repression of Aircraft
Hijacking, see supra note 79; The Montreal Convention (Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation) supra note 79; Convention Unique sur les
Stupenfiants (Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs), March 25, 1973, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204.
99 United States v. Perez-Hererra, 610 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1980). The subjective territorial
principle is discussed supra at 21 text accompanying notes 21-35.
100 Id. and cases cited supra note 65.
101 See supra notes 2-35 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Hererra, 610 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Cadena, 585 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.) cert.
deniedsub nom. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Marine v. United States, 352 F.2d
174 (5th Cir. 1965). See also, Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Rivard v. United
States 375 F.2d 889 (1967) (in both cases significant harmful effects had actually occurred
within United States territory so the objective territorial theory could properly be asserted).
1144 [Vol. 73
EXTRA TERRITORIAL CRIME
inchoate offense, still inchoate, has no effects, but an element of an in-
choate offense (here an overt act) can take place within the territory. If
it does, the subjective territorial theory will properly authorize jurisdic-
tion. In addition, it appears that a conspiracy seen not as an inchoate
offense but as a completed offense having its own intrinsic harmful ef-
fects, has its territorial sius where that conspiracy takes place. Although
the place of the conspiracy's intended impact clearly has a strong inter-
est in stopping it from occurring, the objective territorial theory cannot
be the vehicle for the assertion of jurisdiction, in as much as no harmful
effect has actually occurred on the asserting state's territory.
Thus, the courts have confused the substantive elements of the
crime of conspiracy with the jurisdictional requirements of the objective
territorial theory. The latter theory requires that an actual detrimental
effect occur within the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction. An
overt act may be a constituent element of the crime of conspiracy, but it
certainly is not a harmful effect,' 03 unless it is argued that the overt act
conceptually moves the situs of the conspiracy to the place of the overt
act, or alternatively, that the harm represented by the conspiracy itself
has now found a sius via the overt act in the territory in which the overt
act occurred. This may be a proper application of the combined subjec-
tive/objective territorial theories. Certainly, however, to say that a co-
conspirator's overt act triggers the traditional objective territorial theory
of jurisdiction is to confuse that theory with the subjective territorial
theory. 104
This confusion, represented by the tendency to apply the objective
territorial principle of jurisdiction indiscriminately, becomes even more
important when we consider the cases in which no overt act occurs
within United States territory. The United States federal laws prohibit-
ing illegal conspiracies to import narcotics into the United States do not
103 United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975), provides a good example of how
this erroneous perception has been developed or rationalized. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals admitted that in Ford, 273 U.S. 593 (1927), and Rivard, 375 F.2d 889 (1967), illegal
contraband had actually been imported into the United States-thus establishing a harmful
effect. The court, however, discounted the distinction as being without significance under the
facts of the case because the conspiracy had been thwarted before importation could occur,
and "because it is immaterial t6 the commission of the crime of conspiracy whether the object
of the conspiracy is achieved." Winter, 509 F.2d at 982. The court said, "[a]n overt act,
seemingly innocent in itself yet in furtherance of the conspiracy, is sufficient under the law of
conspiracy." 509 F.2d at 982. The court continued, "[w]e see no reason why it should be any
different for jurisdictional purposes, to the extent that proof of an overt act is required." 509
F.2d at 982. See also reasoning in United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1979).
This result, of course is appropriate, but the objective territorial principle is not the appropri-
ate theoretical vehicle to accomplish it.
104 If the courts are holding that the intended effect of an inchoate offense is sufficient to
trigger jurisdiction in the state of intended impact, a new theory of jurisdiction has been
established. See discussion infra at notes 136-89 and accompanying text.
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require an overt act as a substantive element of the offense.'0 5 The
courts recently have reasoned that, since no overt act is required in order
to commit a conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States, the
objective territorial principle will apply to assert jurisdiction over such a
conspiracy, even though no overt act or any effect has occurred within
the United States, provided that the parties zbtended to violate United
States law in the United States. 0 6
Certainly, if the substantive definition of the offense does not re-
quire an overt act, such a crime occurs without one. 10 7 It is quite an-
other thing, however, even if harm was intended to occur within United
States territory, to hold that the objective territorial principle is the basis
for asserting jurisdiction over this offense, when that theory requires that
a detrimental effect occur within the territory. When a conspiracy as
defined in the United States Code has occurred, applying non-sequiturs to
extend the objective territorial principle to occasions in which no effect
at all occurs within the territorial jurisdiction does violence to the prin-
ciple of objective territoriality to the point of obliterating its meaning.
The approach is even more troubling, in that without any element of
the offense occurring within the territorial limits, the subjective territo-
rial theory is not appropriate either.
The conceptual problem described above developed out of a need
to find a way to effectuate United States laws prescribing conspiracies to
import illegal drugs into the United States. Obviously, as the crime of
conspiracy itself is designed to be a tool of prophylaxis, it must have an
extraterritorial application if it is to regulate importation. The courts
reasoned correctly that the Congress intended the laws to have an extra-
territorial application; this legislative intent is clearly inferred (when not
explicit) from the above-stated logic. 10 8 The need for extraterritorial ap-
plication is one which properly ought to be satisfied. The difficulty has
arisen from the courts' failure to articulate an appropriate theory for
this application. A brief analysis of some key cases which have extended
105 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (1976). Section 846 provides, "[a]ny person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or
fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." Id. §846. Section 963
states, "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this sub-
chapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum
punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt
or conspiracy." Id § 963.
106 See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 886 n.39 (5th Cir. 1979). The RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1,
402(1)(c), has recognized this same notion.
107 This article will not discuss the problems related to this issue.




or applied jurisdiction extraterritorially and of the Restatement Draft fol-
lows. The faulty reasoning of the cases has created a confused conceptu-
alization of the law on jurisdiction which risks doing harm to the
integrity of the objective and subjective territorial theories. Analysis of
their correct results and their conceptual defects will provide the vehicle
for the development of a "new" or hybrid theory of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
In Brown v. United States,°109 a prototypical decision which both poses
the problem and suggests the solution, the defendant was convicted of
conspiracy to import heroin into the United States from West Germany.
The defendant, a United States citizen in the military and stationed in
Germany, conspired with others to use the United States Army mails to
import heroin into the United States. Indeed, the parties to the conspir-
acy actually caused packages, which they believed to contain heroin, to
be sent to the United States via the Army mail. The packages, however,
contained corn starch and dextrose. Thus, a conspiracy to import her-
oin into the United States did occur and was proved. It occurred in
Germany, however, and no overt act (of the conspiracy to import her-
oin) occurred within the United States. Although there was an impact
on United States territory, this impact was benign. The defendant ar-
gued that for jurisdiction to obtain, there would have to be a detrimen-
tal effect which was intended to occur and indeed which did occur on
United States territory or, alternatively, that there must be activity
which portends potential damage to United States governmental inter-
ests. Neither the impact nor the required potential danger occurred.110
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, even though what was
actually imported happened to be benign, "the conspiracy alleged im-
plicated a crime that would produce detrimental effects within this nation
and affront its denouncement of the possession and trafficking in drugs
like those contemplated in this case.""'1
The court does not explain upon which theory of jurisdiction its
decision is based. However, it cites as authority for its holding
Strassheim v. Dai'y,112 the classic case representing the objective territo-
rial principle. It will be recalled that Strasheim held that an offense
committed abroad whose harmful effects are intended to and do occur
within United States territory did provide jurisdiction on that theory.
The Brown court cites, in the same breath and immediately following its
109 United States v. Brown, 549 F.2d 954 (4th Gir. 1977) (the defendant was charged with
violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 952(a), 960, 963 (1976)).
110 21 U.S.C. § 956 (1976).
111 Id. (emphasis added).




citation of Strassheim, United States v. Pizzarusso,113 the classic case ap-
plying the protective principle of jurisdiction. In Pizzarusso, the court
applies the protective principle to cases of potential damage, but the
court makes it clear that there must be danger or potential damage to
national security, integrity, sovereignty, or governmental operations
before the protective theory may be appropriately asserted. The Fourth
Circuit in Brown, after citing Strassheim and Pk'zarusso, cites and quotes
for effect United States v. Bowman, 1 4 which suggests the protective prin-
ciple and, further, manifests the court's confusion over the distinction
between the objective territoriality and protective principles: "certain
crimes [such as conspiracy to defraud a corporation in which the United
States is the sole stockholder] are such that to limit their locus to the
strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute and open a large immunity for frauds as easily
committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at
home."' 15
In Bowman, the defendants had conspired to order from and give a
receipt for 1,000 tons of fuel from the Standard Oil Co. (whose agent
was in on the ruse), but to take only 600 tons abroad, although they
would collect cash for the total 1,000 tons and pocket the excess. 1 16
This, of course, would defraud the paying corporation, of which the
United States Government was the sole shareholder. The United States
Supreme Court in this decision articulates the purpose and the ambit of
the protective principle, without denominating it as such. It cites and
describes sections of the United States Code relating to "offenses against
the operation of the government," ' 1 7 which necessarily, due to the na-
ture of the crimes involved, are designed to provide jurisdiction in
United States courts when acts are done which are intended to damage
the function of government, such as forging or altering a ship's pa-
pers, 118 or enticing desertions from the naval service. 19 The Court goes
on to analogize the conspiracy to defraud a corporation in which the
United States Government was the sole shareholder to those "offenses
against the operation of the government."' 120 Thus, the theory of juris-
diction invoked in Bowman is clearly the protective principle. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown cites Bowman as the proper
analogue providing the solution to their jurisdictional problem, and, in-
113 United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968).
114 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
115 Id. at 98.
116 Id. at 95-96.
117 Id. at 98-99.
118 Id. at 99.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 102.
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cidentally, makes the same error as the Bowman court in not clearly fo-
cusing on or denominating the appropriate theory. The Brown court
stated, "the statutory sanctions against importation of narcotics so pre-
cisely match the proscriptions in Bowman that further citation would be
superfluous."1 21 The court never clearly articulated what potential or
actual danger or impairment of governmental operations, or damage to
national security, sovereignty, or integrity it is contemplating, but one
may speculate that it might be the abuse of the Army mail system, the
violations of our customs barriers for these illicit and dangerous pur-
poses, or, perhaps, even the danger to national security that is posed by
the drug problem and the military.
The cases which, in the past year or so, have found jurisdiction ap-
propriately to be asserted over extraterritorial conspiracies to import
narcotics have degenerated from the lack of precision in Brown to im-
proper application of the objective territorial theory of jurisdiction. In
United States v. Ricardo,122 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
convictions for conspiracy to import marijuana into the United
States, 23 although the conspiracy, which took place entirely abroad (no
overt acts within the United States), was thwarted before any marijuana
was imported. It held that the district court had jurisdiction, pursuant
to the objective territorial theory, to try the defendants and that United
States drug smuggling conspiracy laws 124 had extraterritorial applica-
tion, as long as the parties intended to violate United States law and to
have the effects of the conspiracy occur within United States territory. 125
The court reasoned as follows. First, the law does not require an overt
act to be alleged or proved in order to convict a person of conspiracy to
import marijuana. The Fifth Circuit has always adhered to the princi-
ple of objective territoriality, "which attache[s] criminal consequences to
extraterritorial acts that are intended to have effect in the sovereign terri-
tory, at least where overt acts within the territory can be proved,"' 26 and
"[i]mplicit in these statutes is the notion that the prescribed prohibitions
apply extraterritorially,"' 27 and "when the statute itself does not require
proof of an overt act, jurisdiction attaches upon a mere showing of in-
121 United States v. Brown, 549 F.2d 954, 957.
122 United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980).
123 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (1976).
124 Id.
125 United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980)(citing United States v. Mann,
615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.
1980); RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 1, § 402(1)(c).
126 United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d at 1128 (citing United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d
862, 885 (5th Cir. 1979)). Of course, this is an incorrect statement of the objective territorial
principle. Jurisdiction may be appropriate under the facts described in the statement, but on
the basis of the subjective, not objective, territorial theory.
127 Id. at 1128 (citing United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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tended territorial effects." 128
United States v. Mann129 is a major decision in the judicial develop-
ment of the notion that jurisdiction over extraterritorial conspiracies is
appropriate under the objective territorial theory even though no effect
actually occurs within United States territory. In Mann, the defendants
were convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States
with the intent to distribute it there. 130 The Fifth Circuit declared that
it was not necessary for the government to allege or prove an overt act to
obtain convictions under the controlled substance conspiracy statutes13 1
because, "[w]hen a conspiracy statute does not require proof of overt
acts, the requirement of territorial effect may be satisfied by evidence
that the defendants intended their conspiracy to be consummated
within the nation's borders."' 132 The court then stated that any other
rule would make it too difficult to enforce our laws and would "defeat
the objective terriorial theory.' 133 Of course, the court is correct to say
that unless jurisdiction can be asserted to apply to these inchoate of-
fenses, "it will be difficult to enforce them."' 34 Amazingly, however, in
the name of "saving" the objective territorial theory, the Fifth Circuit
transubstantiates an intent into a jurisdiction triggering territorial effect.
This is surely extending territoriality beyond its borders.
The courts may be recognizing that jurisdiction over an inchoate
offense properly obtains when the offense has as its aim the commission
of a crime on the territory of the forum state. It is conceptually inaccu-
rate, however, to place this extension of jurisdiction within the objective
territorial theory. It is suggested that assertion of jurisdiction in such a
case is proper and, indeed, is acceptable under international law, but
that the extension represents a new theory of jurisdiction based on the
combined notions of objective territoriality, the protective principle and
128 Id. at 1129 (citing United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885 n.39 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Thus the court asserted jurisdiction over the conspiracy, because its aim was to import narcot-
ics into the United States. Jurisdiction was approved, even though no overt act or effect
occurred on United States territory, because no overt act is required as an element of the
crime.
129 United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1980).
130 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (1976).
131 United States v. Rodriguez, 615 F.2d 906, 919 n.37 (5th Cir. 1980).
132 Id. at 671.
133 Id. See also United States v. Jonas, 639 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (Ist Cir.
1980); which held that, as long as the parties intend that the conspiracy be consummated
within United States territorial boundaries, the jurisdictional requirement is met.
See also United States v. Willis, 639 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 198 1)(no discussion at all of the
problem of jurisdiction); United States v. Espinosa Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980) (no
mention of jurisdictional problem); United States v. Perez-Hererra, 610 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Streifel, 507 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
134 615 F.2d at 67.
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the universality theory of jurisdiction. As will be argued, the Restatement
Drafls new tentative "standard of reasonableness" does not properly
work to extend the objective territorial theory, but functions to limit the
application of this theory.13 5
VI. RECTIFICATION OF CONCEPTUAL DEFICIENCY
If it is important that United States narcotics conspiracy laws be
applicable extraterritorially, it is also important that the theoretical ba-
sis for their application be valid. One attempt to develop a proper con-
ceptual basis for their extraterritorial application might be found in the
analysis of the Pizzarsso case,1 36 which at least clearly distinguished the
objective territorial and the protective principles. A few insightful
courts and commentators have detected the validity of the
distinction. 137
United States v. Layton,138 provided the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California with the vehicle to apply, among
other theories, both the objective territorial and the protective principles
of jurisdiction. 139 The defendant, Larry Layton, was charged with the
following counts relating to the killing of Congressman Leo Ryan and
the wounding of the American deputy chief of mission in Guyana: (1)
conspiracy to murder a United States Congressman; 140 (2) aiding and
abetting in the murder of a United States Congressman; 14 1 (3) conspir-
acy to murder an internationally protected person; 142 (4) aiding and
abetting in the attempted murder of an internationally protected per-
son. The district court found that it had proper subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over all counts, "[t]he courts of the United States have repeatedly
upheld the power of Congress to attach extraterritorial effect to its penal
statutes, particularly where they are being applied to citizens of the
United States,"' 43 including "the objective territorial principle, which
135 See in/ha text accompanying note 158 for a discussion of this issue.
136 United States v. Pizzaruso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968).
137 See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981); United States v. Egan,
501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631
(D.P.R. 1978); United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Note, supra
note 72; N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, supra note 79, at 136.
138 United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
139 The court believed that at least the following theories would be appropriate for asser-
tion of jurisdiction (1) objective territoriality; (2) protective principle; (3) nationality; (4)
passive personality. Id. at 216.
140 18 U.S.C. § 35 1(d) (1976).
14' Id. § 351(a).
142 Id. § 1117.
143 Id. at 215. The courts cites: Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932);
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. King, 552 F.2d
833, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
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allows countries to reach acts committed outside territorial limits, but
intended to produce, and producing, detrimental effects within the na-
tion." 1 44 Of course, if there was an actual impact on the territory of the
United States, it might have been in Washington, D.C. and in Northern
California where Congressman Ryan served.
The protective principle, however, is the more apt theory for assert-
ingjurisdiction since the effect of the killing clearly ended Congressman
Ryan's ability to continue functioning as a congressman (hence impair-
ing an important governmental function). The murder could also be
construed as a threat to or actual damage to the abstraction of United
States sovereignty. The court clearly saw this application, "[t]he alleged
crimes certainly had apolenlt'all adverse effect upon the security or gov-
ernmental functions of the nation, thereby providing the basis for juris-
diction under the protective principle."1 45
The court in Lay/on, held that Congress is free to extend jurisdiction
extraterritorially if it wishes.1 46 It stated:
Courts have generally inferred such jurisdiction for two types of statutes:
(1) statutes which represent an effort by the government to protect itself
against obstructions and frauds; and (2) statutes where the vulnerability of
the United States outside its own territory to the occurrence of the prohib-
ited conduct is sufficient because of the nature of the offense to infer rea-
sonably that Congress meant to reach those extraterritorial offenses.147
144 509 F. Supp. at 215-16 (citing Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); United States
v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Fer-
nandez, 496 F.2d 1294, 1296 (5th Cir. 1974).
145 509 F. Supp. at 216. In United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10-11 the court deter-
mined that Congress intended to apply these statutes extraterritorially. In making this deci-
sion the court explained that the statutes implicitly and necessarily suggest an extraterritorial
application. The court cites United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922), to the effect
that when a statute does not explicitly state that it is to apply extraterritorially, the scope of
jurisdiction depends on the purpose of Congress, as evidenced by the description and nature
of the crime. "When the crime is of a nature that, unless it is applied extra-territorially, the
government will be powerless to protect itse/f in many instances. In such cases, we will infer
that Congress intended to extend its application extraterritorially." 260 U.S. at 217.
In Bowman, it will be recalled that jurisdiction was extended to cover a fraud which
damaged United States' integrity and governmental function. Note also, that the nationality
of the participants played a significant role in Bowman, as the conviction of the three United
States nationals was affirmed on the ground that they were "certainly subject to such laws as
[the United States] might pass to protect itself and its property." 260 U.S. at 102.
To analogize the statutes proscribing conspiracies to murder Congressmen or interna-
tionally protected persons to narcotics conspiracy statutes is apt, only if we consider conspira-
cies to import narcotics to be a potential danger to United States sovereignty, security,
integrity or governmental function.
146 509 F. Supp. at 216. See supra note 145.
147 509 F. Supp. at 218. See Skirotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941), wherein the United
States Supreme Court combines the protective and nationality principles as follows:
a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directy injurious to the government and are capa-
ble of perpetration without regard to particular locality, is to be construed as applicable
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This latter type, of course, would be appropriate only if the offense
portended danger to one of the above-articulated national interests.
The Layton court made it evident that the protective principle was
its primary basis for asserting jurisdiction, when it explained that the
statutes relating to attacks on elected representatives are more of a
threat to the operation and function of government and to United
States national security than the acts which triggered jurisdiction over
extraterritorial theft of government property, violations of the bank-
ruptcy laws and uttering of forged treasury notes.1 48 It stated: "[a]n at-
tack upon a member of Congress, wherever it occurs, equally threatens
the free and proper functioning of government." 149 This is different
from the standard murder statute as, "congressmen were singled out for
protection because of the position they hold in our constitutional gov-
ernment, because their protection is important to the integrity of the
national government and therefore serves an important interest of the
government itself."'150 Thus, explained the court, if Congress assigns its
members to function in the arena of foreign relations, they must often
travel abroad. If it were possible to escape jurisdiction by attacking con-
gress people while abroad, obstruction and injury to the governmental
function, sovereignty, and integrity would occur.151
The possible analogy between Lay/on and extraterritorial conspira-
cies to violate United States narcotics laws should not be ignored. The
extremely high level of drug abuse in the United States, the tremendous
amount of money available for the purpose of violating drug trafficking
laws, and the damage drug trafficking and drug abuse causes, could all
possibly be construed as threats to United States integrity, or even to its
security, or to be an obstruction to the proper functioning of our govern-
mental operations when a United States customs area is violated. In-
deed, since drug smuggling bypasses United States customs laws and
directly challenges that governmental function, conspiracy to smuggle
drugs clearly presents a potential threat to a governmental function.152
to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there
be no express declaration to that effect.
Id. at 73-74 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Gotten, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir.)
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973)ourisdiction over theft of government property overseas);
Stegmon v. United States, 425 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 837 (1970) (juris-
diction allowed over violations of bankruptcy laws relating to the concealment of assets, as the
statute "was enacted to serve important interests ofgovernment, not merely to protect individuals
who may be harmed by the prohibited conduct.") (emphasis added). See also United States v.
Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974).
148 509 F. Supp at 219; see supra cases cited in note 147.
149 509 F. Supp. at 219.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See Note, supra note
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Thus, the protective principle might be a conceptual vehicle which
would allow the extraterritorial application of United States laws
prohibiting conspiracy to import narcotics without violation by the
courts of accepted and distinct principles of jurisdiction over extraterri-
torial crime. The problem, of course, is the possible extension of the
notions of what constitutes a threat to national security, sovereignty, or
governmental function to the point of danger or absurdity. 53 The ap-
plication of the protective principle as discussed above is more apt con-
ceptually, however, than that of the objective territorial theory as the
former has always contemplated the assertion of jurisdiction for poten-
tial danger from inchoate offenses.
A. POSSIBILITY AND PARAMETERS OF A NEW THEORY
The traditional conceptual distinctions are important for proper le-
gal analysis. Conceptual integrity is lost if jurisdiction may extend ex-
traterritorially on a territorial theory, without any connection with the
territory at all, or on a protective principle, without an important na-
tional or governmental interest having been violated or threatened. The
72, at 1200. The problem with this, of course, is that all conspiracies to violate customs regu-
lations would then trigger the protective principle.
153 It should be noted that the extension of the application of the protective principle as
explained above is not without extreme risk. The application of the protective principle in
the name of self-defense or protection of sovereignty to extraterritorially committed offenses
may easily be abused to cover unjust and politically oriented judgments. Even if the protec-
tive principle is theoretically a sound basis for assertion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial
conspiracies (which do not have any elements of effects occur within the territory), its ex-
tended application should not be undertaken lightly.
Consider, for example, the following description of the case of Mr. Esmail, a Brooklyn-
born American of Arab descent, who was convicted in Israel in June of 1978, of being a
member of a proscribed organization-the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Israel had amended its criminal law in 1972, as follows:
2(a). The courts in Israel are competent to try under Israeli law a person who has
committed abroad an act which would be an offense if it had been committed in Israel
and which harmed or was intended to harm the State of Israel, its security, property or
economy or its transport or communication links with other countries.
PENAL LAW AMENDMENT (Offences Committed Abroad)(amend. No. 4) 5432-1972, Laws of
the State of Israel No. 26 (197101972).
Pursuant to this law, Mr. Esmail was arrested and jailed when he arrived in Israel to visit
his dying father. The New York Times reported the event.
Mr. Esmail was arrested and jailed when he arrived in Israel last December to visit his
dying father. Israeli authorities concede that they have no evidence he intended harm
while in the country. But they argue that since the P.F.L.P. is committed to Israel's
destruction, and since Mr. Esmail received training in guerrilla warfare during a month's
visit to Libya in 1976, his associations are ample ground for conviction. The Israeli pros-
ecutor has asked for ajail term to discourage other foreigners from joining groups like the
P.F.L.P., which recruited Mr. Esmail at Michigan State. But would-be terrorists should
need no persuasion that they will be sternly dealt with if they attempt violence in Israel.
N.Y. Times, June 11, 1978, § IV, at 20, col. 1, cited and quoted in N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J.
SWEENEY, supra note 79, at 120.
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traditional theories are available to provide for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion without abuse. They should not be violated as they have been for
reasons of expediency, especially when they lend themselves to the de-
velopment of a new or hybrid theory. The courts have been struggling to
assert jurisdiction by expanding the notion of territoriality too far. This
struggle suggests the need to articulate an appropriate theory and the
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States has provided the
model for its development.1 54 Neither the court decisions nor the Restate-
ment, however, articulate the existence or parameters of the new theory.
Indeed, both place the needed development of the law into the wrong
conceptual rubric. One of the aims of this article is to place the exten-
sion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conspiracies into an appropriate
and traditionally valid conceptual mode. Thus, rather than suggesting
the extension of either the objective territorial theory or the protective
principle exclusively, the appropriate (or the least theoretically risky)
approach to take may be to allow jurisdiction over extraterritorial con-
spiracies to import narcotics (or other offenses which have been univer-
sally condemned) when they have reached a stage which makes it clear
that the intent is to impact on the territory or on the significant interests
of the forum state. This approach would be based on the Restatement'
notion of "reasonableness" and upon the need to allow the state on
whose territory the offense will impact (which has the most significant
interest in the crime) to assert jurisdiction. Of course, jurisdiction would
not be appropriate when it is "exorbitant," that is, according to the Re-
statement of the Foreign Relations Law, when the state with an accepted
theoretical basis for asserting jurisdiction nevertheless has a less signifi-
cant interest than another state which also has a valid basis. 155 This new
approach would be a hybrid theory combining the protective universal
and objective territorial principles, in that no effect will actually have
occurred within United States territory, but the culmination of the con-
spiracy or other inchoate offense is close enough to fruition that it may
be considered sufficient to trigger jurisdiction. Thus, for jurisdiction to
obtain, the conspiracy will have to relate to a significant state interest,
universally recognized as such, and will have to have clearly gone far
enough to establish both the intended goal of the conspiracy and the
fact that the impact or effect of the crime would have been certain to
have occurred, had intervention not prevented it. This is essentially
what the courts in many of the cases described above have attempted to
do, either by not clearly articulating a theory or by applying the wrong
theoretical basis. In such cases the Restatement of the Forezgn Relations
154 See infra notes 157-89 and accompanying text.
155 This approach is discussed fully in the following section.
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Law has recognized the validity of the assertion of jurisdiction. Again,
however, no clear theory of jurisdiction is articulated.
It is important to recognize that assertion of jurisdiction in such
cases must be based on a new theory of jurisdiction, different from both
the objective or subjective territorial theories and from the protective
principle. No effect or element of the offense, has occurred within the
asserting state's territory and no danger is posed to the requisite signifi-
cant national interests. It will not do simply to suggest that jurisdiction
will properly obtain when the state with the most significant interest or
the state with the proper law is found, unless the onl'v pertinent basis for
the assertion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime is found based on
the "most significant interest" test. The Restatement Draft does not con-
template such a notion.' 56 It does provide, however, the mechanism for
developing a new hybrid theory of jurisdiction.
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE TENTATIVE DRAFT OF THE RESTATEMENT
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES-AN ATTEMPT AT THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A THEORY
In its introductory note to its section on jurisdiction, the American
Law Institute describes its perception of the current approaches to the
question of jurisdiction:
[t]erritoriality and nationality have remained the principal points of de-
parture for evaluating the exercise of jurisdiction, but in determining their
meaning rigid concepts have been displaced by broader criteria embracing
principles of reasonableness and fairness in accommodating overlapping or con-
ficting interests of states, and meeting concerns for affected individuals
and other private interests. This means that courts (and other decision
makers), learning from the approach to comparable problems in private
international law, are increasingly inclined to analyze various interests, ex-
amine contacts and links, give effect to justified expectations, search for the
center of gravity of a given situation, and develop priorities. This Restate-
ment articulates this approach as the principle of reasonableness.1
57
The Restatement Drafts approach actually is a modified application
of the above-described and analyzed traditional approach to jurisdic-
tion. The only modification of the traditional principles of jurisdiction
relates essentially to limiting the exercise of jurisdiction. The notion of
reasonableness functions to disallow or to find unlawful the exercise of
jurisdiction, even pursuant to a traditional basis for it, when such exer-
cise would be "exorbitant."' 158 The Restatement Draft accepts the long-
156 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1.
157 Id. at 92-93.
158 Id. § 403(1), "Although one of the bases for jurisdiction under Section 402 is present, a
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established proposition that international law forbids a state to exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe other than on an accepted basis of jurisdic-
tion.' 59 This is only a recognition of what states of the world have long
maintained. States have traditionally "refused to give judgments of
other states based on assertions of jurisdiction which were considered
extravagant; increasingly they have begun to object to the exercise of
jurisdiction itself as a violation of international principles."'' 60 Thus, a
state cannot properly prescribe activity or exercise jurisdiction unless it
is pursuant to an "accepted" basis of jurisdiction. It has been shown
above that the international law controlling the jurisdiction to prescribe
and to adjudiate long ago transcended the limitations of formal and
strict reliance on territoriality as the basis of state power. 61 It is ac-
cepted in international law and state practice to prescribe activity and
to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction based on the defendant's national-
ity or the defendant's conduct which occurs: (1) partially within the
state; 62 (2) outside the state producing certain kinds of injury within
the state; 63 (3) outside the nation creating threats to the national secur-
ity or important governmental functions.' 64 These bases of jurisdiction
have been deemed to be and are accepted as "reasonable,"'' 65 while reli-
ance on nationality of the injured person is seen by the Restatement Draft
as "exorbitant."' 166
It is clear, however, that jurisdiction cannot be properly asserted
unless it is based on an accepted theory or principle of jurisdiction. 167
Nevertheless, as demonstrated above, United States courts have asserted
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conspiracies to import narcotics (and
other crimes), even when no actual effect has occurred within United
States territory, and have articulated the assertion as being on the basis
of the objective territorial theory. 168 Such an application of jurisdiction
state may not apply law to the conduct, relations, status, or interest. . . if the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable. . . ." See also id. § 403 comment a.
159 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. ser. A, No. 10 (judgment of Sept. 7, 1927); RE-
STATEMENT DRAFr supra note I, § 403 comment a.
160 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, at 94. The fact that there have been no objections
to the assertion ofjurisdiction over narcotics conspiracies indicates acceptance of the practice,
if not its theory.
161 See the development of this transcendence in supra notes 10-74 and accompanying text;
see also RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, at 94, § 441(i) (jurisdiction to adjudicate based in
part on objective territoriality theory).
162 See supra notes 20-129 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 36-62 and accompanying text; see a/so, RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note
1, at 94.
164 See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
165 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note I at 94.
166 Id. at 94, § 402 comment e. It is clearly not seen as exorbitant by other states.
167 Id. § 403, comment a.
168 See supra notes 84-135 and accompanying text.
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does not fit within the traditional objective territorial theory. The ques-
tions now become: (1) whether nations of the world have come to ac-
cept the assertion of jurisdiction in such cases; and (2) whether the
theory of such assertion is appropriate. It is arguable that the recent
Restatement Draft suggests an affirmative answer to both questions by ex-
panding, without explanation, the objective territorial theory to include
offenses in which effects are simply intended to impact on the asserting
state's territory. This section will attempt to determine: (1) whether this
has occurred; (2) whether the Restatement Draft actually suggests that the
notion of "reasonableness" functions as a "new" and independent the-
ory for asserting jurisdiction, or whether it serves simply as a tool for
limiting the assertion of jurisdiction when a traditional basis for it al-
ready exists; and (3) if the notion of "reasonableness" functions as the
vehicle for extending the objective territorial theory to include intended
effects, whether this effect is theoretically proper. 169
Section 402 of the Restatement Draft provides in relevant part:
Subject to Section 403, a statute may, under international law, exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe and apply its law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its
territory;
(b) civil (not criminal) jurisdiction;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or ir intended to have substantial
e fect within its territor;
(2) the conduct, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside its
territory; or
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals
which is directed against the security of the state or certain state interests.
The bases of jurisdiction provided or described in section 402 are
clear enough. Sub-parts (1)(a) and (1)(b) relate to the traditional no-
tions of subjective 170 and objective 71 territoriality. The objective terri-
torial principle traditionally has applied to extraterritorial offenses
whose effects are intended to and actually occur within the territory of
the state asserting jurisdiction. 172 Sub-part (1)(c) does recognize an ex-
tension of the traditional objective territorial principle to include in-
tended effects within ambit by providing for jurisdiction to be asserted
for "conduct outside [the asserting state's] territory which has or is in-
tended to have substantial effect within its territory."' 73
169 RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 1, § 402.
170 Id. § 402(1) (a).
171 Id. § 402(1)(c).
172 This is also the theoretically correct approach, as the objective territoriality is based on
effects within the territory. The United States courts in civil matters have rejected extending
the effects theory to intended effects. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
173 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402(1)(c).
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The reporters' comments state that, "the bases indicated in section
402 have been accepted in general."' 174 But has this extension of the
objective territorial principle in fact been accepted in international law
and, if so, is this extension conceptually valid or wise? The Restatement
Draft cites no authority for this proposition. Presumably, the United
States narcotics conspiracy cases discussed above would be domestic au-
thority for such an extension and the dearth of international protest
might suggest acceptance of the result, but neither of these factors sug-
gests that there is any conceptual validity to the extension.' 75 It is sub-
mitted that it has no conceptual validity.
The Restatement Draft, however, does help to answer a pertinent
question that the United States narcotics conspiracy cases raise. Even if
intended effects are sufficient to allow assertion of jurisdiction, what lim-
itations to this assertion exist?
It could be argued that the rule of reasonableness derived from fac-
tors or choice of law principles, such as those listed in section six of the
Restatement Of the Conflicts of Laws,176 represents the policy basis of the
extension of the objective territorial theory to include intended effects.
Certainly, the result would be desirable in some cases. The rule of rea-
sonableness may suggest the need to, and the appropriateness of, ex-
panding or extending the traditional jurisdiction principles to include
thwarted extraterritorial narcotics and other conspiracies when they are
intended to have substantial effect within the forum state's territory. Fac-
tors indicating that the expansion would be reasonable or appropriate
include: (1) the internationally condemned nature of the offense and the
need of the international systems of justice (e.g., to curtail narcotics traf-
ficking); 177 (2) the need of the forum state to curtail and to preempt
narcotics conspiracies aimed at that state; 178 (3) the non-existence of any
factors which would suggest that the assertion of jurisdiction would be
considered unreasonable.' 79 This, however, does not necessarily suggest
174 Id. § 402 comment.
175 French Law No. 70-1320 of Dec. 31, 1970 (codified at C. SANTIk PUBLIQUE, ART. L.
627), provides for prescriptive adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction over attempts to
violate and combinations ("entents" or "associaioans") with a view to violate French narcotics
laws. These "inchoate" offenses will be punished like the completed offense. There have been
French cases in which jurisdiction was asserted and approved for negotiations with regard to
the sale and purchase of narcotics for "use" in France. See, e.g., Criminal Decision of Aug. 18,
1973, Dalloz, Sommaire 131 (1973); Decision of Oct. 25, 1962, Bull. Grim. No. 292
(1962)(cited in IV DRorr PENAL, ENCYCLOPEDIA DALLOZ, STUPEFIENTS § 48). No theory
for the assertion of jurisdiction is articulated.
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
177 Id. § 6(2)(a).
178 Id. § 6(2)(b).
179 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 403. Of course this would generally only be true
when the conspiracy is intercepted on the high seas and not on another state's territory. See
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that the extension of the objective territorial theory is proper.
By its own terms the Restatement Draft appropriately does not con-
sider the rule of reasonableness as a new theory or basis for asserting
extraterritorial jurisidction or for allowing an extension of any of the
traditional bases of jurisdiction. Interestingly, all references in the Re-
statement Draft to the rule of reasonableness (and all analogy to conflict
of law rules) relate to the question of limiting the assertion ofjurisdiction
over conduct when traditional bases of jurisdiction already exist. There is
no indication that the rule of reasonableness was intended to be an in-
dependent basis of jurisdiction. 1180
Thus, it is clear that the essential purpose of the rule of reasonable-
ness in the Restatement Draft is to hmit the assertion of jurisdiction even
when there is a legitimate basis for it. The only possible argument for
interpreting the rule of reasonableness to be the authority for the exten-
sion of the objective territorial theory of jurisdiction to include those
inchoate offenses which have as their goal to impact on the United
States, is to suggest that if the rule of reasonableness, designed to pre-
vent the assertion ofjurisdiction when it is exorbitant, would not find an
assertion jurisdiction over such offenses to be exorbitant, and therefore,
the assertion must be appropriate. Thus, one could reason by the boot-
strap, .that the courts have recognized the appropriateness of asserting
jurisdiction in such cases and so have extended the scope of the objective
territorial principle. It is suggested, however, that although the asser-
tion of jurisdiction in such cases may provide a needed and proper re-
sult, to pin this result on the territorial principle obliterates that theory's
coherency.
Perhaps the "rule of reasonableness" should be the theoretical basis
for an expansion of the bases of jurisdiction in a manner which will
maintain the conceptual integrity of the traditional jurisdictional the-
ory. This article has attempted to establish the theoretical weakness of
making the expansion uniquely via the objective territorial principle.
Rather, a hybrid theory based on the objective territorial, universality
and protective principles may legitimize the extension without doing vi-
olence to the integrity of the theories.
It appears that courts in the United States and the authors of the
Restatement Draft have developed the notion that jurisdiction may be as-
serted over cases of at least serious and nearly universally condemned
extraterritorial conspiracies or other offenses as long as the offense was
intended to have "substantial effect" on the territory of the United
id. § 403, reporters' note 7, which states in part: "In applying the principle of reasonable-
ness, the excercise of criminal jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in the territory of
another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive upon that state's sovereignty."
180 Id. at reporters' note 10, § 402 comment.
1160 [Vol. 73
1982] EXTRA TERRITORIAL CRIME 1161
States, and as long as the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable.181 It is
suggested that such an assertion comports with international law. Al-
though it is a proper assertion, when the courts and the Restatement Draft
articulate the assertion as being based on the objective territorial princi-
ple, it becomes conceptually defective. It is more conceptually accurate
to provide that jurisdiction is based on a combination of notions under-
lying the protective principle, the objective territorial, and universality
theories. This is a hybrid theory. It is consistent with traditional juris-
dictional theory and with the Restatement Draft's rule of reasonableness
181 Section 403 of the Restatement Drq/ provides:
Limitation on Jurisdiction to Prescribe:
(1) Although one of the bases for jurisdiction under Sec. 402 is present, a state may not
apply law to the conduct, relations, status, or interests of persons or things having con-
nections with another state or states when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether the exercise ofjurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating all the
relevant factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, or
(ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the reg-
ulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,
or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic
system;
() the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the inter-
national system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
(3) An exercise ofjurisdiction which is not unreasonable according to the criteria indi-
cated in Subsection (2) may nevertheless be unreasonablb if it requires a person to take
action that would violate a regulation of another state which is not unreasonable under
those criteria. Preference between conflicting exercises of jurisdiction is determined by
evaluating the respective interests of the regulating states in light of the factors listed in
Subsection (2).
(4) Under the law of the United States:
(a) a statute, regulation or rule is to be construed as exercising jurisdiction and
applying law only to the extent permissible under Sec. 402 and this section, unless
such construction is not fairly possible; but
(b) where Congress has made clear its purpose to exercise jurisdiction which may
be beyond the limits permitted by international law, such exercise of jurisdiction, if
within the constitutional authority of Congress, is effective as law in the United
States.
Finally, with regard to the conceptual validity of the extension of the objective territorial
principle alone, it should be noted that the Restatement Draft recognizes that when Congress
has made clear its purpose to assert jurisdiction and such assertion is constitutional albeit
violative of internationl law, it will still be effective law. Thus, although the Restatement Draft
states that such extension is appropriate and, although United States courts have approved
such an extension, it may still be a violation of international law.
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and provides a conceptually valid means of reaching the results sought
by the United States thwarted narcotics conspiracy case.
Of course, assertion of jurisdiction over a conspiracy, even when it
has as its goal a criminal effect in the United States, which is intercepted
while it is centered on the territory of another country could be consid-
ered exorbitant and unreasonable by international law and the Restate-
ment Draft. 18 2 This poses an interesting problem with regard to many of
the narcotics conspiracy cases. It has been shown that acts upon vessels
and aircraft are deemed to occur upon the "floating territory" of the flag
state or within the state's "special maritime jurisdiction."' 8 3 The prob-
lematical cases representing the focus of this article, of course, are those
in which the conspiracy is ongoing upon a foreign vessel which is inter-
cepted on the high seas.' 8 4 The United States Department of State gen-
erally asks permission of the flag state to board the vessel, to arrest and
to prosecute the conspirators. 18 5 If permission were not granted, the ap-
propriateness of any assertion of jurisdiction would have to be decided
on the basis of principles such as those indicated in Section 403 of the
Restatement Draft, which applies the notion of reasonableness as a means
of limiting the exercise ofjurisdiction.' 86 Section 403 generally considers
assertion of jurisdiction over acts committed on foreign territory as be-
ing exorbitant, unless the acts are universally condemned. 8 7
Seen in this light, decisions of United States courts which have ap-
proved the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign nationals for narcotics
conspiracies thwarted on board foreign vessels upon the high seas may
reflect either an accepted expansion of the traditional bases of jurisdic-
tion as described above or a recognition by the United States govern-
ment that it has no basis for asserting jurisdiction valid in international
law other than comity of the approving state. 188
182 Id.
183 See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1,
at reporters' note 8; see also 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(38), 1472(i) (1976).
184 See supra cases cited in notes 84-135. These cases all reflect the recent United States
extension of the objective territorial principle.
185 The writer's experience in the Office of the Legal Advisor substantiates this, as does
discussion with Knute E. Malmborg, Assistant Legal Advisor, Office of the Legal Advisor,
United States Department of State (Dec. 17, 1981); see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 589
F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979).
186 See supra note 182. It is possible to suggest that the assertion of jurisdiction without
permission may always be inappropriate (exorbitant) when the conspiracy occurs or is
thwarted on board a foreign flag-vessel on the high seas, as this is essentially for-
eign"territory." RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 403.
187 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, at reporters' note 7.
188 Id. § 403(4)(b), states that this expansion of the bases ofjurisdiction may be beyond the




Recent United States case law has expanded jurisdiction over ex-
traterritorial crime (especially in narcotics conspiracies) in a manner
which violates international legal notions of jurisdiction. If our courts
are to avoid problems and confusion in the development of a coherent
reaction to crime on an -international scale involving matters of extradi-
tion and international judicial cooperation, a coherent and consistent
theory or set of theories are necessary to provide subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over extraterritorial offenses. Clearly, a more reasoned approach to
the problem of jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses needs to be de-
veloped. The hybrid theory of jurisdiction provides such an
approach. 189
189 The hybrid theory will be developed further, especially in its relation to extradition, in
a forthcoming article by the author.
1982] 1163
